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FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
STATISTICS, THEORIES, POLICIES, AND BEYOND
MIKE KOEHLER1
ABSTRACT
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is not a new law; it was enacted in
1977. Nevertheless, 2015 was a commemorative year, as it marked the fifth
anniversary of the Department of Justice declaring a “new era” of FCPA
enforcement, the fifth anniversary of Congressional FCPA reform hearings, and the
third anniversary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) issuing FCPA guidance.2 In addition to these mileposts, 2015
was also a notable year in several other respects as highlighted in this article.

1 Mike Koehler is an Associate Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law.
Professor Koehler is the founder and editor of the website FCPA Professor
(www.fcpaprofessor) and author of the book THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW
ERA (Edward Elgar Publishers, 2014). Professor Koehler’s FCPA expertise and views are
informed by a decade of legal practice experience at a leading international law firm. The
issues covered in this article, current as of January 1, 2016, assume the reader has sufficient
knowledge and understanding of the FCPA, as well as FCPA enforcement, including the role
of the Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission in enforcing the FCPA
and the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve FCPA scrutiny. Interested readers can
learn more about these topics and others by reading the author’s FCPA Professor website
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com), specifically the FCPA 101 page of the site
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101).
This article is part of a continuing series of yearly analysis by the author of FCPA
enforcement data and related issues.
For 2014, see Mike Koehler, A Snapshot of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 143 (2016) [hereinafter Koehler, A Snapshot].
For 2013, see Mike Koehler, A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative, 22 MICH. ST.
INT’L L. REV. 961 (2014) [hereinafter Koehler, Narrative].
For 2012, see Mike Koehler, An Examination of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Issues,
12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 317 (2013).
For 2011, see Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope,
15 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 1 (2012).
For 2010, see Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99 (2011).
For 2009, see Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of
its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389 (2010).
2 Interested readers can learn more about these developments at the following sources: A
Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, DOJ & ENFORCEMENT DIV. SEC
(Nov.
14,
2012),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf; Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: Hearing on S. 111-1005 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks at the
24th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, DOJ (Nov. 16, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-24thnational-conference-foreign-corrupt.
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This article, part of an annual series, paints a picture of FCPA and related
developments from 2015. Specifically, this article dissects FCPA enforcement in a
number of ways and highlights meaningful statistics from 2015 as well as historical
comparisons. Thereafter, this article discusses a range of noteworthy issues from
2015 such as: expansive and evolving FCPA enforcement theories, judicial scrutiny
of FCPA and related enforcement theories, policy pronouncements and
developments relevant to FCPA issues, and developments beyond the FCPA that
nevertheless touch upon FCPA issues or are otherwise relevant to a similar space.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This article paints a picture of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and related
developments from 2015. Specifically, Part II of this article dissects FCPA enforcement
in a number of ways and highlights statistics from 2015 as well as historical comparisons.
Thereafter, Part III of this article discusses a range of noteworthy issues from 2015 such
as: expansive and evolving FCPA enforcement theories, judicial scrutiny of FCPA and
related enforcement theories, policy pronouncements and developments relevant to
FCPA issues, and developments beyond the FCPA that nevertheless touch upon FCPA
issues or are otherwise relevant to a similar space.
In addressing these topics, this article will benefit anyone seeking an informed base
of FCPA knowledge and related legal and policy issues in the FCPA’s modern era.
II. 2015 FCPA ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS AND HISTORICAL COMPARISONS
Part II of this article dissects FCPA enforcement and highlights meaningful
statistics from 2015 as well as historical comparisons in the following ways:
Department of Justice (DOJ) corporate FCPA enforcement, Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) corporate FCPA enforcement, aggregate corporate FCPA
enforcement, and individual FCPA enforcement.
A. DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement
As demonstrated in Table I, in two corporate FCPA enforcement actions 3 in 2015
the DOJ collected approximately $24.2 million in settlement amounts.
3 Corporate FCPA enforcement statistics in this article use the “core” approach. The core
approach focuses on unique instances of corporate conduct regardless of whether the conduct at issue
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Table I—2015 DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
Company

Fine

Resolution
Vehicle4

Origin5

Related
Individual
Action6

Louis Berger
International7

$17.1 million

DPA

Related civil
investigation8

Yes

IAP Worldwide9

$7.1 million

NPA

Unclear10

Yes

Total

$24.2 million

As highlighted in Tables II and III below, in 2015 DOJ corporate FCPA
enforcement, measured both in terms of the number of core actions and settlement
amounts, was significantly below historical averages.
involved a DOJ or SEC enforcement action or both (as is frequently the case), regardless of whether
the corporate enforcement action involved a parent company, a subsidiary or both (as is frequency the
case), and regardless of whether the DOJ and/or SEC brought any related individual enforcement
action (as is occasionally the case). What is an FCPA Enforcement Action?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 7,
2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/what-is-an-fcpa-enforcement-action (providing additional
information on this method of quantifying FCPA enforcement). This method of computing FCPA
statistics is consistent with the DOJ’s approach. See Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 22,
2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-72 (quoting DOJ’s FCPA Unit Chief), and is a
commonly accepted method used by other scholars in other areas. See, e.g., Michael Klausner & Jason
Hegland, SEC Practice In Targeting and Penalizing Individual Defendants, HARV. LAW SCH. F. ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/
09/03/sec-practice-in-targeting-and-penalizing-individual-defendants/.
DPA refers to a deferred prosecution agreement and NPA refers to a non-prosecution
agreement. To learn more about these agreements in the FCPA context, see Mike Koehler, The
Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010) [hereinafter Koehler, Façade of FCPA].
4

Koehler, Narrative, supra note 1, at 965 n.3. “Refers to the event or events which initially
prompted the scrutiny that resulted in the FCPA enforcement action.” Id.
5

6 Id. at 965 n.4. “Refers to employees of the corporate entity resolving the FCPA enforcement
action.” Id.
7 Press Release, DOJ, Louis Berger International Resolves Foreign Bribery Charges (July 17,
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/louis-berger-international-resolves-foreign-bribery-charges
[hereinafter Louis Berger International].

DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA—Year in Review, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 6, 2016),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/doj-enforcement-of-the-fcpa-year-in-review-6/ [hereinafter, 2016 Year in
Review]. The DPA states: “after the government had made [the company] . . . aware of a False
Claim Act investigation, [the company] conducted an internal investigation, discovered potential
FCPA violations, and voluntarily self-reported to the [DOJ] the misconduct.” Id.
8

IAP Worldwide Services Inc. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation, FCPA
PROFESSOR (June 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iap-worldwide-services-inc-resolvesforeign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation [hereinafter IAP Worldwide Services].
9

See id. The NPA makes no mention of voluntary disclosure or other potential origins of the
action.
10
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Table II—Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010–2015)
Year

Core Actions

2015

211

2014

712

2013

713

2012

914

2011

1115

2010

1716

Table III—Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts (2010–2015)
Year

Settlement Amounts

2015

$24.2 million17

2014

$1.25 billion18

2013

$420 million19

2012

$142 million20

2011

$355 million21

2010

$870 million22

11 Corporate FCPA Enforcement in 2015 Compared to Prior Years, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 7,
2016),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/corporate-fcpa-enforcement-in-2015-compared-to-prior-years/
[hereinafter Corporate Enforcement in 2015].
12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.
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Tempting as it might be, few meaningful conclusions should be drawn from 2015
DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement. For starters, year-to-year FCPA enforcement
statistics, and the arbitrary cutoffs associated with them, are of marginal value given
that many non-substantive factors can influence the timing of an actual corporate
FCPA enforcement action.23 Moreover, and as highlighted in more detail in Table
VII below, FCPA enforcement statistics in most years are impacted by a few unique
events and often one or a small group of enforcement actions significantly skew
enforcement statistics.24
Notwithstanding the above limitations of yearly enforcement statistics, not to
mention the small quantity of DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2015 on
which to calculate statistics, two statistics are nevertheless noteworthy.
The first notable statistic is that both enforcement actions were resolved through
either a non-prosecution agreement (“NPA”) or deferred prosecution agreement
(“DPA”).25 These resolutions are consistent with the FCPA’s modern trend of the
DOJ resolving corporate FCPA enforcement actions through such controversial
alternative resolution vehicles.26 Indeed, since 2010 approximately 85% of corporate
DOJ enforcement actions have involved either an NPA or DPA. 27
The second notable statistic is that both corporate enforcement actions in 2015
also included related charges against company employees. 28 While such actions may
seem like an obvious result given that business organizations can only be exposed to
criminal FCPA violations based on the conduct of actual employees,29 this 2015
statistic is notable because 72% of DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions since
2008 have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company

Koehler, A Snapshot, supra note 1. Because FCPA enforcement actions that involve
both a DOJ and SEC component are typically announced on the same day, and because the
DOJ and SEC are separate enforcement agencies, it is common for FCPA enforcement actions
to be delayed while one agency waits for the other to finish its investigation of the conduct at
issue and its negotiation of a resolution with a company. Additional non-substantive factors
that can influence the timing of an FCPA enforcement action, although far from an exclusive
list, include DOJ and SEC staffing issues (including employee departures or leaves) as well as
securing corporate board approval for resolving an FCPA enforcement action. Id.
23

24 In this regard, in 2016 there may be an approximate $900 million enforcement action
that alone will eclipse total FCPA settlement amounts in several prior years. See The
Burgeoning Uzbekistan Telecommunication Investigations, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 9, 2015),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-burgeoning-uzbekistan-telecommunication-investigations.
25

Koehler, Façade of FCPA, supra note 4, at 909.

26 To learn more about NPAs and DPAs, including why such alternative resolution
vehicles are controversial, see, e.g., Koehler, Narrative, supra note 1; Koehler, Façade of
FCPA, supra note 4; Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution Agreements
and Deferred Prosecution Agreements on FCPA Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 499
(2015) [hereinafter Koehler, Measuring the Impact].
27

2016 Year in Review, supra note 8.

A Focus on DOJ Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 12, 2016),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-doj-individual-actions.
28

29

Id.
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employees.30 Only time will tell whether 2015 was the beginning of a trend reversal
on prosecution of company employees or merely a statistical outlier.
B. SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement
As demonstrated in Table IV, in nine corporate FCPA enforcement actions in
2015 the SEC collected approximately $114.8 million in settlement amounts.
Table IV—2015 SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
Company

Settlement
Amount

Resolution
Vehicle

Origin

Related
Individual
Action

Bristol-Myers
Squibb31

$14.7 million

Administrative
Order

Unclear

No

Hyperdynamics32

$75,000

Administrative
Order

SEC
investigation33

No

Hitachi34

$19.1 million

Settled Civil
Complaint

Unclear

No

BNY Mellon35

$14.8 million

Administrative
Order

Unclear

No

Mead Johnson36

$12 million

Administrative
Order

SEC
investigation37

No

30 Id. (emphasis in original). For a hypothesis why so few DOJ corporate enforcement
actions result in related charges against company employees, see Koehler, Measuring the
Impact, supra note 26.

Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb With FCPA Violations (Oct. 5,
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-229.html.
31

32 Hyperdynamics Announces Settlement with the SEC, HYPERDYNAMICS (Sept. 29, 2015),
http://investors.hyperdynamics.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=934289.
33 According to the company’s disclosure—“the SEC had issued a subpoena to
Hyperdynamics concerning possible violations of the FCPA.” Id.

Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Hitachi With FCPA Violations (Sept. 28, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-212.html.
34

35 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges BNY Mellon With FCPA Violations (Aug. 18,
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-170.html [hereinafter BNY Mellon].
36 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Mead Johnson Nutrition With FCPA Violations (July
28, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-154.html [hereinafter Mead Johnson].

The administrative order states:
In 2011, Mead Johnson received an allegation of possible violations of the FCPA in
connection with the Distributor Allowance in China. In response, Mead Johnson
conducted an internal investigation, but failed to find evidence that Distributor

37
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Company

Settlement
Amount

Resolution
Vehicle

Origin

Related
Individual
Action

BHP Billiton38

$25 million

Administrative
Order

SEC
investigation39

No

FLIR Systems40

$9.5 million

Administrative
Order

Voluntary
Disclosure

Yes

Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Co.41

$16.3 million

Administrative
Order

Voluntary
Disclosure

No

The PBSJ
Corporation42

$3.4 million

DPA

Voluntary
Disclosure

Yes

As highlighted in Tables V and VI below, SEC corporate FCPA enforcement in 2015
was up slightly compared to historical averages, even though the slight increase in
enforcement activity resulted in settlement amounts lower than historical averages.
Table V—Corporate SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010–2015)
Year

Core Actions

2015

943

Allowance funds were being used to make improper payments to HCPs. Thereafter,
Mead Johnson China discontinued Distributor Allowance funding to reduce the
likelihood of improper payments to HCPs, and discontinued all practices related to
compensating HCPs by 2013. Mead Johnson did not initially self-report the 2011
allegation of potential FCPA violations and did not thereafter promptly disclose the
existence of this allegation in response to the Commission’s inquiry into this matter.
In the Matter of Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., at 4 (July 28, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-75532.pdf.
38 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges BHP Billiton With Violating FCPA at Olympic Games
(May 20, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-93.html [hereinafter BHP Billiton].

The company disclosed that it received information requests from the SEC in August
2009. See Issues To Consider From The Recent BHP Billiton Enforcement Action, FCPA
PROFESSOR (May 27, 2015), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/issues-to-consider-from-therecent-bhp-billiton-enforcement-action.
39

Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Oregon-Based Defense Contractor With FCPA
Violations (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-62.html.
40

41 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Goodyear With FCPA Violations (Feb. 24, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-38.html#.VOy19fnF91Z.
42 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former Executive at Tampa-Based Engineering Firm
With FCPA Violations (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-13.html
[hereinafter Tampa-Based Engineering Firm].
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2014

744

2013

845

2012

846

2011

1347

2012

1948

Table VI—SEC FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts (2010–2015)
Year

Settlement Amounts

2015

$114 million49

2014

$327 million50

2013

$300 million51

2012

$118 million52

2011

$148 million53

2010
$530 million54
For the same reasons discussed above, few meaningful conclusions should be
drawn from 2015 SEC corporate FCPA enforcement. Nevertheless, two statistics are
noteworthy.
The first noteworthy statistic is that eight of the nine corporate enforcement
actions (89%) in 2015 were resolved either through an administrative order or a
DPA.55 As a result of these controversial resolution vehicles, there was no judicial
scrutiny of 89% of SEC FCPA enforcement actions from 2015. 56 This statistic is
consistent with a clear trend regarding SEC corporate FCPA enforcement. For
43

2016 Year in Review, supra note 8.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id. It should be noted that the numbers in Table VI are approximate figures.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id.
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instance, in 2014 there was no judicial scrutiny of 86% of SEC FCPA enforcement
actions,57 and in 2013 there was no judicial scrutiny of 50% of SEC FCPA
enforcement actions.58
The second noteworthy statistic is that seven of the nine corporate enforcement
actions (78%) in 2015 did not result in related enforcement actions against company
employees.59 Again, this statistic is consistent with prior years as 83% of corporate
SEC FCPA enforcement actions since 2008 have not (at least yet) resulted in any
related charges of company employees. 60 Similar to the criminal context, business
organizations only can be exposed to civil FCPA violations based on the conduct of
actual employees.61 Indeed, the 83% statistic is even more striking than the
comparable 72% DOJ statistic given that the SEC, as a civil law enforcement
agency, has a lower burden of proof in an enforcement action.62
Analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement data separately in Tables I through
VI above is informative given that the DOJ and SEC are separate law enforcement
agencies and different issues may arise in DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement
actions.63 On the other hand, analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement data in the
aggregate is also informative because such a perspective provides a more holistic
view of FCPA enforcement.
C. Aggregate Corporate FCPA Enforcement
In 2015, the DOJ and SEC together collected approximately $139 million in
eleven core corporate enforcement actions. 64 The average settlement amount was
57 Id. For an extended discussion of the origins and controversy of SEC administrative
orders and DPAs, see Koehler, A Snapshot, supra note 1, at 166-69.
58

2016 Year in Review, supra note 8.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61 A Focus on SEC Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 11, 2016),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-sec-individual-actions.

FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 11, 2016), http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101/
(found under drop down menu labeled “Q. What about FCPA-related civil litigation?”).
62

63 As a civil law enforcement agency, the SEC’s burden of proof is preponderance of the
evidence compared to the DOJ’s criminal burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. How
Rare Are Parallel DOJ And SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions Against Individuals?, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Aug. 14, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/how-rare-are-parallel-doj-and-sec-fcpaenforcement-actions-against-individuals/ [hereinafter How Rare].

As a general matter, the SEC has jurisdiction over “issuers” (companies —domestic and
foreign—with shares registered on a U.S. exchange or otherwise required to make filings with
the SEC). Comparing DOJ FCPA Enforcement to SEC FCPA Enforcement is Not a Valid
Comparison, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 17, 2014), http://fcpaprofessor.com/comparing-doj-fcpaenforcement-to-sec-fcpa-enforcement-is-not-a-valid-comparison/ [hereinafter Not a Valid
Comparison]. In other words, the SEC generally does not have jurisdiction over private
companies or foreign companies that are not issuers. Id. Thus, the two DOJ corporate
enforcement actions from 2015 did not have an SEC component because the companies
(Louis Berger International and IAP Worldwide) were private companies not subject to SEC
jurisdiction. 2016 Year in Review, supra note 8. As a general matter, the DOJ has criminal
jurisdiction over “issuers,” “domestic concerns,” (i.e. any business entity with a principal
64
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approximately $12.6 million and the median was approximately $14.7 million. 65 The
range of settlements was, on the high end, $25 million (BHP Billiton),66 and on the
low end, $75,000 (Hyperdynamics). 67
A popular issue, or so it seems, is to analyze whether corporate FCPA
enforcement is up or down in any given year compared to prior years. Again, yearto-year FCPA enforcement statistics, and the arbitrary cutoffs associated with them,
are of marginal value given that many non-substantive factors can influence the
timing of an actual corporate FCPA enforcement action.
Nevertheless, and accepting year-to-year FCPA statistics for what they are, the
issue remains: how best to analyze and interpret FCPA statistics over time?
Consider the following analogy. In Year One, a city issues 100 speeding tickets and
collects $20,000 in fines on those tickets. In Year Two, a city issues ninety speeding
tickets; however, because certain drivers were going really fast, the city collects
$25,000 in fines on those tickets. Was there less enforcement in Year Two compared
to Year One? Most, it is assumed, would say that enforcement in Year Two was less
than in Year One even though the city collected more money from speeding tickets
in Year Two.
The same logic applies to year-to-year FCPA statistics and the more accurate and
reliable way to keep and analyze FCPA enforcement statistics is by focusing on
unique instances of FCPA scrutiny (not settlement amounts) and tracking
enforcement actions using the ‘core’ approach.68 Using this approach, corporate
FCPA enforcement in 2015 was up slightly compared to 2014 and 2013 and
generally consistent with historical norms, notwithstanding the fact that DOJ
corporate enforcement in 2015 was substantially down compared to prior years and
that settlement amounts in 2015 were significantly below historical averages. 69
These points are best demonstrated by the below table which aggregates DOJ and
SEC enforcement statistics over time and highlights unique circumstances which
significantly skewed enforcement data statistics in any particular year.

place of business in the U.S. or organized under U.S. law), and non-U.S. companies and
persons to the extent a bribery scheme involved conduct while in the territory of the U.S. Not
a Valid Comparison, supra note 64. Compared to the SEC’s civil burden of proof of
preponderance of the evidence, the DOJ has a higher beyond a reasonable doubt burden of
proof in a criminal prosecution. How Rare, supra note 63.
A notable statistic from 2015—in contrast to prior years—is that each SEC corporate
enforcement action, actions in which the DOJ theoretically could have also brought an action,
did not result in a parallel DOJ enforcement action. 2016 Year in Review, supra note 8.
65

Corporate Enforcement in 2015, supra note 11.

66

2016 Year in Review, supra note 8.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Corporate Enforcement in 2015, supra note 11.
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Table VII—Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007–2015)
Year

Core

Settlement
Amounts

Of Note

2007

15

$149
million

Six enforcement actions involved Iraq Oil for
Food conduct and these enforcement actions
comprised 40% of all enforcement actions and
approximately 50% of the $149 million amount. 70

2008

10

$885
million

2009

11

$654
million

2010

21

$1.4 billion

The $800 million Siemens enforcement action
comprised approximately 90% of the $885 million
amount.71
The $579 million KBR / Halliburton Bonny
Island, Nigeria enforcement action comprised
approximately 90% of the $645 million amount. 72
Six enforcement actions, all resolved on the
same day, involved various oil and gas companies’
use of Panalpina in Nigeria. Panalpina also resolved
an enforcement action on the same day.73
Two enforcement actions (Technip and Eni /
Snamprogetti) involved Bonny Island conduct.74
In other words, there were 14 unique corporate
enforcement actions in 2010. Of further note, the
two Bonny Island enforcement actions,
Technip($338 million) and Eni/Snamprogetti ($365
million) comprised approximately 50% of the $1.4
billion amount.75

2011

16

$503
million

2012

12

$260
million

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id.
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Year

Core

Settlement
Amounts

Of Note

2013

9

$720
million

2014

10

$1.6 billion

Two enforcement actions (Alstom - $772 million
and Alcoa - $384 million) comprised
approximately 72% of the $1.6 billion amount.79

2015

11

$139
million

No enforcement actions significantly skewed the
statistics.80

Totals

115

$6.37
billion

The $398 million Total enforcement action
comprised approximately 55% of the $720 million
amount.78

D. Individual FCPA Enforcement
FCPA enforcement by the DOJ and SEC against business organizations is just
one prong of FCPA enforcement. Both the DOJ and SEC have repeatedly stressed
the importance of also enforcing the FCPA against individuals. 81 For instance, DOJ
FCPA Unit Chief Patrick Stokes stated that the DOJ is “very focused” on
prosecuting individuals as well as companies and that “going after one or the other is
not sufficient for deterrence purposes.”82 Likewise, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Sung-Hee Suh stated that “the prosecution of individuals for corporate
wrongdoing has been and continues to be a high priority for the Criminal Division
and for the Justice Department as a whole.” 83 Similarly, SEC Enforcement Director
Andrew Ceresney stated, “Holding individuals accountable for their wrongdoing is
critical to effective deterrence and, therefore, the Division considers individual
liability in every case. . . . The Commission is committed to holding individuals
accountable and I expect you will continue to see more FCPA cases against
individuals.”84 The next section highlights 2015 DOJ and SEC individual FCPA
enforcement actions as well as historical comparisons.
78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

A Focus on SEC Individual Actions, supra note 61.

82 DOJ Prosecution of Individuals—Are Other Factors at Play?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan.
21, 2015), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-prosecution-of-individuals-are-other-factors-atplay-4.
83 Sung-Hee Suh, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Keynote at the ABA-CJS Global White
Collar Crime Institute 2015, 3 (Nov. 19, 2015), (transcript available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/criminal_justice/2015/2015shanghai_key
note.authcheckdam.pdf).
84 Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, Keynote Address at the ACI’s 32nd FCPA
Conference,
4
(Nov.
17,
2015),
(transcript
available
at
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As demonstrated in Table VIII, in 2015 the DOJ filed or announced FCPA
criminal charges against eight individuals.
Table VIII—2015 DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions
Individual

Employer/Former
Employer

Related Corporate
Enforcement Action

Various Private
Companies Seeking
Business with Petroleos
de Venezuela S.A.

No

Daren Condrey86

Transports Logistic
International

No

Vicente Garcia87

SAP International

No

Louis Berger
International

Yes

IAP Worldwide Services

Yes

Chestnut Consulting
Group Inc.

No

Roberto Rincon
Abraham Shiera85

Richard Hirsch
James McClung88
James Rama89
Dmitrij Harder90

As highlighted in Table IV, the number of DOJ individual FCPA enforcement
actions in 2015 was generally below historical averages.

https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-fcpa-keynote-11-17-15.html)
Ceresney, Keynote Address].

[hereinafter

85 See Indictment at 4, United States v. Roberto Enrique Rincon-Fernandez, No. 15CR654,
https://www.scribd.com/doc/294158102/U-S-v-Rincon-Shiera-Indictment.
86 See Press Release, DOJ, Russian Nuclear Energy Official Pleads Guilty to Money
Laundering Conspiracy Involving Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, (Aug. 31,
2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-nuclear-energy-official-pleads-guilty-moneylaundering-conspiracy-involving.
87 See Press Release, DOJ, Former Executive Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Bribe
Panamanian Officials (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-executivepleads-guilty-conspiring-bribe-panamanian-officials.
88

See Louis Berger International, supra note 7.

89

See IAP Worldwide Services, supra note 9.

See Press Release, DOJ, Former Owner and President of Pennsylvania Consulting
Companies
Charged
with
Foreign
Bribery
(Jan.
6,
2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-owner-and-president-pennsylvania-consultingcompanies-charged-foreign-bribery.
90
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Table IX—DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007–2015)91
Year

Individual Charged with Criminal
FCPA Offenses

2015

8

2014

10

2013

12

2012

2

2011

10

2010

33 (including 22 in the Africa Sting Case)

2009

18

2008

14

2007

7

As demonstrated in Table X, in 2015 the SEC brought FCPA civil charges
against 2 individuals.
Table X—2015 SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions
Individual

Employer/Former
Employer

Related Corporate
Enforcement Action

Vicente Garcia92

SAP International

No

Walid Hatoum93

The PBSJ Corporation

Yes

As highlighted in Table XI, similar to the above DOJ historical comparison,
while the number of SEC individual FCPA enforcement actions in 2015 was
generally consistent with the prior two years, the number of actions was generally
below historical averages.

91

See A Focus on DOJ Individual Actions, supra note 28.

See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former Software Executive With FCPA
Violations (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-165.html.
92

93

Tampa-Based Engineering Firm, supra note 42.
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Table XI—SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007–2015)94
Year

Individuals Charged With Civil
FCPA Offenses

2015

2

2014

2

2013

0

2012

4

2011

12

2010

7

2009

5

2008

5

2007

7
III. NOTEWORTHY ISSUES FROM 2015

With a proper foundation in FCPA statistics both in 2015 and over time, Part III
of this article discusses a range of noteworthy issues from 2015 such as: expansive
and evolving FCPA enforcement theories, judicial scrutiny of FCPA and related
enforcement theories, policy pronouncements and developments relevant to FCPA
issues, and developments beyond the FCPA that nevertheless touch upon FCPA
issues or are otherwise relevant to a similar space.
A. Expansive and Evolving FCPA Enforcement Theories
As highlighted above, approximately 80% of corporate FCPA enforcement
actions in 2015 were brought by the SEC. 95 As discussed below, most of these
enforcement actions were based on expansive, evolving—and controversial—
enforcement theories not subjected to any judicial scrutiny because of the resolution
vehicles typically used by the SEC.96

94

See A Focus on SEC Individual Actions, supra note 61.

See A Focus on DOJ Individual Actions, supra note 28; see also A Focus on SEC
Individual Actions, supra note 61.
95

96 See generally BNY Mellon, supra note 35; Mead Johnson, supra note 36; BHP Billiton,
supra note 38.
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In the minds of some, the FCPA is simple: “Just don’t bribe.” 97 However, more
sophisticated observers recognize the absurdity of such an absolutist position. In
short, a company can do things with customer or prospective customer X and it is
generally not a legal violation. Yet, when the same company does the same thing
with customer or prospective customer Y the U.S. government might call it bribery.
Several SEC corporate enforcement actions from 2015 highlight this controversial
aspect of FCPA enforcement.98
Consistent with several prior enforcement actions in the FCPA’s modern era, 99
the SEC brought two enforcement actions against healthcare companies for their
alleged corrupt interactions with physicians employed by foreign healthcare systems.
In the first enforcement action, Mead-Johnson, without admitting or denying the
SEC’s findings in an administrative cease-and-desist order, agreed to pay
approximately $12 million based on the following SEC’s findings:
Despite prohibitions in the FCPA and Mead Johnson’s internal policies,
certain employees of Mead Johnson’s majority-owned subsidiary in China
. . . (“Mead Johnson China”), made improper payments to certain health
care professionals (“HCPs”) at state-owned hospitals in China to
recommend Mead Johnson’s nutrition products to, and provide
information about, expectant and new mothers. 100
The Mead Johnson enforcement action contained several other notable features.
For starters, the action lacked any meaningful factual allegation against the corporate
defendant resolving the action. Rather, the SEC merely found in conclusory fashion
that: (i) “Mead Johnson China’s books and records were consolidated into Mead
Johnson’s books and records, thereby causing Mead Johnson’s consolidated books
and records to be inaccurate;” and (ii) “Mead Johnson failed to devise and maintain
an adequate system of internal accounting controls over Mead Johnson China’s
operations sufficient to prevent and detect the improper payments that occurred over
a period of years.”101
Moreover, the SEC made seemingly contradictory findings regarding Mead
Johnson’s internal controls. On the one hand, the SEC found:
Mead Johnson has established internal policies to comport with the FCPA
and local laws, and to prevent related illegal and unethical conduct. Mead
Johnson’s internal policies include prohibitions against providing
improper payments and gifts to HCPs that would influence their
recommendation of Mead Johnson’s products. . . . The use of the
97 “Good Companies Don’t Bribe—Period” was the title of a Minneapolis Star Tribune
business column which assailed those who have criticized various aspects of the FCPA or
FCPA enforcement. See Issues to Consider from the Recent BHP Billiton Enforcement Action,
supra note 39.
98 See generally BNY Mellon, supra note 35; Mead Johnson, supra note 36; BHP Billiton,
supra note 38.

See 2 Enforcement Theories, 17 DOJ Corporate Enforcement Actions, 0 Individual
Prosecutions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 24, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/2-enforcementtheories-17-doj-corporate-enforcement-actions-0-individual-prosecutions./.
99

100

In the Matter of Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., supra note 37, at 2.

101

Id. at 2, 4.
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Distributor Allowance to improperly compensate HCPs was contrary to
management’s authorization and Mead Johnson’s internal policies. 102
Yet on the other hand, the SEC order also found that “Mead Johnson failed to
devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls over Mead
Johnson China’s operations sufficient to prevent and detect the improper payments
that occurred over a period of years.” 103
In the second enforcement action against a healthcare company, Bristol-Myers
Squibb, without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings in an administrative ceaseand-desist order, agreed to pay $14.7 million based on the following SEC findings:
Through various mechanisms . . . certain sales representatives of [a joint
venture of a Chinese subsidiary] improperly generated funds that were
used to provide corrupt inducements to [healthcare professionals] in the
form of cash payments, gifts, meals, travel, entertainment, and
sponsorships for conferences and meetings in order to secure new sales
and increase existing sales.104
The Bristol-Myers Squibb enforcement action, like the Mead-Johnson action and
many others from prior years, subjected corporate interaction with foreign healthcare
professionals to different standards than interaction with U.S. healthcare
professionals who frequently receive gifts, meals, sponsorships for conferences, and
other things of value from healthcare companies. 105
SEC enforcement actions in 2015 against BHP Billiton and BNY Mellon further
highlight the absurdity of the absolutist “just don’t bribe” position. The key findings
from the SEC’s administrative cease-and-desist order against BHP Billiton
(“BHPB”), which the company neither admitted nor denied, were as follows: 106
“[B]HP Billiton was an official sponsor of the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing,
China.107 As such, the company received ‘priority access to tickets, hospitality suites
and accommodations for during the games.’108 Not surprisingly, the company invited
650 people (customers, suppliers, etc.) to attend the Olympic Games with three to
four day hospitality packages.109 According to the SEC’s findings, approximately

102

Id. (numeration omitted).

103

Id.

104 In
the Matter of Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co.,
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-76073.pdf.

at

2

(Oct.

5,

2015),

To learn more about this double standard in the healthcare context, see Mike Koehler,
The Uncomfortable Truths and Double Standards of Bribery Enforcement, 84 FORDHAM L.
REV. 525 (2015) [hereinafter Koehler, The Uncomfortable Truths].
105

106 See BHP Billiton, supra note 38; see also Scott Patterson, SEC Fines BHP $25 Million
After Gifts Probe, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-charges-bhpwith-violating-fcpa-at-2008-summer-olympics-1432127870.
107

Patterson, supra note 106.

108

Id.

See In the Matter of BHP Billiton Ltd. and BHP Billiton PLC (May 20, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-74998.pdf.
109
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75% of these invitees were not alleged ‘foreign officials.’ Thus no problem. 110
However, the SEC found that approximately 25% of the people invited were alleged
‘foreign officials’ primarily from Africa and Asia and that an even smaller
percentage of these invited ‘foreign officials’ actually attended the Olympic
Games.”111
Based on the above findings, the SEC found:
BHPB recognized that inviting government officials to the Olympics
created a heightened risk of violating anti-corruption laws and the
company’s own Guide to Business Conduct, but the internal controls it
developed and relied upon in an effort to address this risk were
insufficient. As a result, BHPB invited government officials who were
directly involved in, or in a position to influence, pending contract
negotiations, efforts to obtain access rights, regulatory actions, or business
dealings affecting BHPB in multiple countries. In addition, BHPB’s
books and records, namely certain internal forms that employees prepared
in order to invite a government official to the Olympics, did not, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect BHPB’s pending
negotiations or business dealings with the government official at the time
of the invitation.112
From a settlement amount perspective, the $25 million BHPB enforcement action
was the largest corporate enforcement action of 2015 and the second largest SEC
only FCPA enforcement action of all-time.113 The fact that a travel and entertainment
action such as BHPB represented the second largest SEC only FCPA enforcement
action of all-time is remarkable and further demonstrates that FCPA settlement
amounts seem to be getting bigger each year just because.114
With good reason, the BHPB enforcement action generated much critical
commentary in the FCPA space. FCPA practitioners at Debevoise & Plimpton
rightly noted:
[The BHPB enforcement action] may well turn out to be one of the more
notable FCPA resolutions in several years. This is because the case
addresses issues of recurring concern to multinational corporations that
have long been sought out as sponsors of—or, at least, purchasers of
hospitality packages for—marquee sporting events.
As good corporate citizens, these firms have come to view the purchase of
tickets and hospitality packages as part of the collaboration with host
entities managing such events, including national governments. This is an
110

Id. at 4.

111

Id.

112

Id. (numeration omitted).

See Issues to Consider from the Recent BHP Billiton Enforcement Action, supra note 39
(meaning the enforcement action only involved an SEC component).
113

114 See Have FCPA Settlement Amounts Increased . . . Just Because?, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/have-fcpa-settlement-amounts-increased-justbecause.
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integral element of brand management and corporate strategy. In the
course of such collaboration, these companies also receive due credit for
making the event a successful interlude during which governments,
business, and society at large, pause to celebrate the endeavor of sport.
Yet the very process of supporting such an event leads to the inevitable
question of “whom may we invite?” From there, the issue of anti-bribery
compliance becomes a central issue for in-house compliance personnel.
The BHPB resolution likely will lead U.S. issuers choosing to provide
hospitality of this kind to expend significant additional time, resources,
and money devising and maintaining controls suggested by the resolution.
Even though the settlement lacks the force of law, it will no doubt raise
considerable pressure on companies to exercise even greater care if
inviting foreign officials to such events, and may cause some firms
subject to the books and records and internal controls provisions of the
FCPA, i.e., those subject to SEC jurisdiction, to reconsider altogether this
practice.115
Similarly, FCPA practitioners at Steptoe & Johnson rightly noted:
This settlement . . . represents one of the most aggressive uses by the SEC
to date of its accounting, and particularly its internal controls, authorities
in an FCPA context. Instead of being predicated on specific questionable
payments, the factual basis of the charges was that the company
recognized the risk that improper quid pro quo arrangements could
develop in connection with the hospitality program, and that such risks
were not appropriately managed by the company’s program, including
through the manner in which they were documented in company
compliance approval tracking forms.
....
The case also suggests that programs in the areas of hospitality and
sponsorship – common and recurring areas of activity for many
companies – may face enhanced scrutiny for systemic adequacy from a
regulatory point of view, at least where larger amounts are involved. Such
a position—if the SEC indeed intends to pursue enforcement actions on
this basis as a matter of enforcement policy—would significantly expand
the scope of risks facing US issuers with appreciable FCPA/anticorruption risks to their business. 116
Troubling as it was, the BHPB enforcement action was likely not the most
controversial SEC corporate enforcement action of 2015. That distinction likely
belongs to the BNY Mellon enforcement action in which the company agreed to pay
115 Andrew M. Levine et al., Internal Controls of Olympic Proportions: BHP Billiton
Settles SEC Investigation of Olympic Hospitality, FCPA UPDATE, (May 2015),
http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2015/05/fcpa_update_may_201
5.pdf.
116 Lucinda A. Low & Tom Best, Does SEC’s Enforcement Action Against BHP Billiton
Take
the
FCPA’s
Accounting
Provisions
Too
Far?,
STEPTOE,
http://www.steptoe.com/publications-10482.html (emphasis in original).
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$14.8 million.117 The enforcement action was based on SEC findings, which the
company neither admitted nor denied in an administrative cease-and-desist order,
that BNY Mellon provided “valuable student internships to family members of
foreign government officials affiliated with a Middle Eastern sovereign wealth
fund.”118 As stated by the SEC:
The violations took place during 2010 and 2011, when employees of
BNY Mellon sought to corruptly influence foreign officials in order to
retain and win business managing and servicing the assets of a Middle
Eastern sovereign wealth fund.
These officials sought, and BNY Mellon agreed to provide, valuable
internships for their family members. BNY Mellon provided the
internships without following its standard hiring procedures for interns,
and the interns were not qualified for BNY Mellon’s existing internship
programs.
BNY Mellon failed to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls around its hiring practices sufficient to provide reasonable
assurances that its employees were not bribing foreign officials in
contravention of company policy.119
Previous SEC FCPA enforcement actions found that companies violated the
FCPA (albeit merely the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions)
for making donations to bona fide charitable foundations favored by an alleged
“foreign official.”120 However, the BNY Mellon enforcement action went a step
further by finding that the company also violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provisions.121 In this regard, the key language from the SEC was the following: “The
internships were valuable work experience, and the requesting officials derived
significant personal value in being able to confer this benefit on their family
members.”122
Notwithstanding the SEC’s findings that the interns did not meet BNY’s
Mellon’s supposed “rigorous criteria” for hiring and were not evaluated and hired
through the company’s “established internship programs,” the following SEC
findings were notable.123 One of the interns (Intern C) was not paid. As to the other
two interns, the SEC’s order states that “because Interns A and B had already

117

BNY Mellon, supra note 35.

118

Id.

119 In the Matter of Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (Aug. 18, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-75720.pdf (numeration omitted).

See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Settled Enforcement Action Against ScheringPlough Corporation for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations (June 9, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18740.htm.
120

121

Issues To Consider From The BNY Mellon Enforcement Action, supra note 39.

122

In the Matter of Bank of New York Mellon Corp., supra note 119 (emphasis added).

123

Id.
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graduated from college,” BNY paid the interns “above the normal salary scale for
BNY Mellon undergraduate interns but below the scale for postgraduate interns.” 124
In other words, the SEC found that BNY Mellon violated the FCPA’s antibribery provisions, not necessarily because of the compensation offered to the
interns, but rather the SEC found that the interns should never have been interns at
BNY Mellon in the first place, and because of this—in the words of the SEC—the
alleged “foreign officials” “derived significant personal value in being able to confer
this benefit on their family members.”125
Like the BHPB enforcement action, the BNY Mellon enforcement action also
generated much critical commentary in the FCPA space. For instance, Jay Darden (a
recent Assistant Chief of the DOJ’s Fraud Section) stated, “It’s not the U.S.
government’s job to regulate hiring policy.” 126 FCPA practitioners at Debevoise &
Plimpton rightly noted:
[T]he government’s investigations in this area face a key threshold legal
issue under the FCPA: can providing a job or internship to an official’s
relative constitute a thing of value to the official him/herself? Can
offering the purely psychological benefit of helping a child or relative
land a job give rise to an actionable attempt at bribery? The official does
not stand to see any personal financial gain from the internship, except in
the arguable circumstance of reducing the official’s financial obligations
to a dependent. But the SEC seems to have purposely disclaimed—or at
least strained—that theory here, given that one of the internships at issue
was unpaid. The SEC addressed this thorny issue in a single sentence in
the Order, asserting that “[t]he internships were valuable work experience,
and the requesting officials derived significant personal value in being
able to confer this benefit on their family members.”
...
[The enforcement action highlights an area of frequent criticism of FCPA
enforcement that] the activity under scrutiny bears a strong similarity to
what are perceived as common practices in the private sector in which
firms seek to accommodate client representative requests in order to
maintain good relations with key decision makers. In this way,
enforcement authorities risk criticism that they are using the FCPA to
excise business practices affecting relationships with foreign officials
abroad that are routinely tolerated in the private sector in the United
States—and that are not unprecedented or even rare in the context of
companies’ relationships with officials employed by the United States
federal, state, and local governments. 127
124

Id.

125

Id.

Jacob Batchelor, SEC Strikes Series Of FCPA Firsts With BNY Mellon Deal, LAW360
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.law360.com/banking/articles/692484/sec-strikes-series-of-fcpafirsts-with-bny-mellon-deal.
126

Sean Hecker et al., The SEC Announces First FCPA Enforcement Action Based on
Allegedly Improper Hiring or Relatives of Foreign Officials, FCPA UPDATE (Aug. 2015),
http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2015/08/fcpa_update_august_2
015.pdf. For additional reading on how the BNY Mellon and related FCPA inquiries of the
127
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The expansive and evolving enforcement theories that largely defined SEC
FCPA enforcement in 2015 were presumably further to the SEC’s goal of enforcing
the FCPA to its “fullest extent”—a term used by SEC Director of Enforcement
Andrew Ceresney in a November 2015 FCPA speech. 128 While acknowledging
certain criticism of the BNY Mellon enforcement action—the SEC’s first internship
action against a financial institution that is expected to be a template for future
enforcement action against similar companies—Ceresney nevertheless stated:
I would suggest that there was ample basis for viewing the internships as
something of value to the foreign officials who requested them for their
relatives, and for concluding that they were given in an attempt to
influence the foreign officials in connection with the performance of their
official duties or to obtain an improper advantage from the foreign
officials.
As I’ve said before, bribes come in many shapes and sizes. And in my
view, the FCPA is properly read to cover providing valuable favors to a
foreign official, as well as providing cash, tangible gifts, travel or
entertainment.129
The question nevertheless arises: just what is the fullest extent of the FCPA?
And in the minds of whom, recognizing that all of the above highlighted
enforcement actions were resolved in the absence of any judicial scrutiny and in the
context of the SEC exercising its leverage against risk averse business organizations
allowed to resolve the actions without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings?130
Indeed, commenting generally on the SEC’s evolving and expansive FCPA
enforcement theories, Richard Grime (the former Assistant Director of SEC
Enforcement) stated:
It’s not that you couldn’t intellectually [conceive of] the violation. It’s
that the government is sort of probing every area where there is an
interaction with government officials and then working backwards from
there to see if there is a violation, as opposed to starting out with the
statute . . . and what it prohibits.131
Compliance professionals advising business organizations on FCPA compliance
do not have the pleasure of working backwards, but must anticipate FCPA risks on a
pro-active basis. Thus, regardless of the validity or legitimacy of the recent
expansive and evolving FCPA enforcement theories, business organizations would
be wise to heed the words of the enforcement agencies which possess the sticks. In
financial services industry highlight a double standard, see Koehler, The Uncomfortable
Truths, supra note 105.
128

Ceresney, Keynote Address, supra note 84.

129

Id.

See Melissa Maleske, The FCPA Predictions GCs Can't Afford To Ignore, LAW360
(Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.law360.com/whitecollar/articles/635068?nl_pk=571fe56c-690f457e-b151102a5685d9eb&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=whitecollar.
130

131

Id. (alterations in original).
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this regard, Ceresney did offer the following guidance in his speech regarding “less
traditional items of value.”132 Relevant questions that compliance personnel should
ask include:
Was the gift, donation, favor, or hiring asked for by the foreign official?
Did the company official believe that the gift, donation, favor, or hiring
would advance their business interests and help them obtain particular
business, or at least obtain an improper advantage with the foreign official?
Was the gift, donation, favor, or hiring consistent with company policy and
practice?
Were the company’s normal procedures followed in connection with the gift,
donation, favor, or hiring?
Would the gift, donation, favor, or hiring have been made if there were no
potential business benefit?133

•
•
•
•
•

Returning to the absurdity of the absolutist “just don’t bribe” position discussed
at the beginning of this section, the expansive enforcement theories in 2015
concerning “things of value” demonstrate once again why the meaning of the
FCPA’s key “foreign official” element matters.134 To some, the meaning of “foreign
official” matters only to those intent on engaging in bribery. 135 However, the proper
scope and meaning of the “foreign official” is an issue of extraordinary practical
significance to businesses and individuals subject to the FCPA. Not because business
organizations want to bribe, but because business organizations competing in good
faith in the global marketplace want to engage in conduct, such as offering
internships or providing entertainment, that is legal and socially acceptable in most
other situations.136
Despite the significance of the meaning of “foreign official” and notwithstanding
the first judicial decision of precedent in 2014 concerning the contours of the term,
much remains foggy about this key FCPA element.137 For instance, in 2015,
consistent with prior years, 55% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved,
in whole or in part, employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled entities
(SOEs).138 Such entities ranged from health care providers, to sovereign wealth
132

Ceresney, Keynote Address, supra note 85.

133

Id.

134

See id.

Doug Cornelius, What is an “Instrumentality” Under the FCPA?, COMPLIANCE
BUILDING (May 21, 2014), http://www.compliancebuilding.com/2014/05/21/what-is-aninstrumentality-under-the-fcpa/.
135

136 Why the Meaning of “Foreign Official” Matters, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 2, 2016),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/meaning-foreign-official-matters-2/.

To learn more about this decision, United States v. Esquenazi (regarding the question of
whether employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprises can be “foreign
officials” under the FCPA), as well as extended discussion of how the decision was flawed,
see Koehler, A Snapshot, supra note 1.
137

138 The
“Foreign Officials” of 2015, FCPA PROFESSOR
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-foreign-officials-of-2015.
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funds, to a real estate development firm, a sugar factory, a cement company, a
diamond mine, and an oil and gas company. 139
Moreover, the meaning of “foreign official” was further expanded in a 2015 DOJ
individual enforcement action alleging that a Maryland resident (Vadim Mikerin),
working for a Maryland corporation (TENAM Corporation), was a Russian "foreign
official.”140 The reason, according to the DOJ, was because “TENAM was a whollyowned subsidiary on TENEX—an entity ‘indirectly owned and controlled by, and
perform[ing] functions of, the government of the Russian Federation.’” 141
Commenting on the ambiguities inherent in FCPA enforcement, George
Terwilliger (former DOJ Acting Attorney General) stated:
It is fundamental to due process that a person of ordinary intelligence
should be able to read a law and understand what is required or
prohibited, as the case may be. Many people of great intelligence on both
sides of an FCPA question debate just such issues . . . . That does not
produce the fair warning that those subject to the law deserve to have. 142
Specific to the “foreign official” element, Timothy Dickinson (a veteran of the
FCPA bar) stated, “Ten years ago, I would have been happy to bet anyone a
doughnut that I could accurately define what a foreign official is. Now, with various
court definitions and a lack of clarity from the DOJ, I fear I might actually lose my
doughnut.”143
B. Judicial Scrutiny of FCPA and Related Enforcement Theories
Doughnuts of course have a hole, and a hole in the DOJ’s modern FCPA
enforcement program has been its struggles when put to its burden of proof. In a
legal system founded on the rule of law, success is best measured when an
enforcement agency is put to its burden of proof in the context of an adversarial
system, not when an enforcement agency exercises its leverage to secure corporate
settlements against risk-averse business organizations through resolution vehicles
not subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny. 144 This section highlights how,
similar to prior years, the DOJ struggled in 2015 in contested individual FCPA
enforcement actions.
139

Id.

See Analyzing The DOJ’s Recent “Foreign Official” Enforcement Theory, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/analyzing-the-dojs-recentforeign-official-enforcement-theory (containing links to original source documents).
140

141

Id.

Jeannie O’Sullivan, FPCA Challenges Make for Spotty Trial Record for DOJ, LAW360
(July 21, 2015), http://www.law360.com/whitecollar/articles/677837?nl_pk=571fe56c-690f457e-b151102a5685d9eb&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=whitecollar.
142

Tom Webb, FCPA Enforcement Critic to Become DOJ Fraud Section Chief, GLOBAL
INVESTIGATIONS
REV.
(Jan.
13,
2015),
http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/1016905/fcpa-enforcement-critic-doj-fraudsection-chief.
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144 See Books, FCPA PROFESSOR, http://fcpaprofessor.com/Books/ (last visited Jan. 15,
2017).
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For the first time since its FCPA trial court debacles in 2011 and 2012, 145 in 2015
the DOJ was put to its burden of proof in an FCPA trial by Joseph Sigelman (a
former executive of PetroTiger who was criminally charged with, among other
things, making improper payments to alleged Colombian officials). 146 Unlike his codefendants, Sigelman exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial, and the case
was expected to shine light on the DOJ’s expansive “foreign official” theory given
that Sigelman was expected to call witnesses—including Colombian judges—to
testify that the officials Sigelman allegedly bribed were not “foreign officials”
because they did not work for a company that performed government functions. 147
The DOJ’s case against Sigelman relied extensively on his former lawyer,
Gregory Weisman (a cooperating co-defendant who pleaded guilty in connection
with the same alleged scheme), who was expected to implicate Sigelman.148
Evidence in the case was to include secretly recorded conversations with
Sigelman.149 However, early in the trial the DOJ’s case imploded when Weisman
acknowledged giving false testimony during the trial, which prompted the presiding
judge to ask Weisman, “[D]id you have a hallucination?”150
The trial quickly adjourned as the DOJ contemplated what to do, recognizing of
course, that the DOJ can control if it is ultimately put to its burden of proof by
pulling a case if it feels it will not prevail. In the end, that is what the DOJ did as it
offered Sigelman a plea agreement to substantially reduced charges and Sigelman
was not sentenced to any jail time. 151 Moreover, at sentencing the judge blasted the
DOJ’s oft-stated rhetoric about the purported difficulty of prosecuting FCPA cases,
which notably in the Sigelman case originated from a corporate voluntary
disclosure.152
To learn more about these cases, see generally Mike Koehler, What Percentage of DOJ
FCPA Losses is Acceptable?, 90 CRIM. L. REV. 823, 733 (2012) (discussing previous FCPA
trial outcomes).
145

146 Press Release, DOJ, Foreign Bribery Charges Unsealed Against Former Chief
Executive
Officers
of
Oil
Services
Company
(Jan.
6,
2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/foreign-bribery-charges-unsealed-against-former-chiefexecutive-officers-oil-services-company.

The Coming Battle Over the Status of Ecopetrol, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 30, 2015),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/the-coming-battle-over-the-status-of-ecopetrol/.
147

148 DOJ Prosecution of Sigelman Ends with No Jail Time, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 16,
2015)
http://fcpaprofessor.com/doj-prosecution-of-sigelman-ends-with-no-jail-time-judgecriticizes-doj-defense-counsel-issues-release/.

See Paul Barrett, U.S. Undercover Tactics Go on Trial in Foreign Bribery Case,
BLOOMBERG, (June 3, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-03/u-sundercover-tactics-go-on-trial-in-foreign-bribery-case.
149

150 See After Judge Asks DOJ’s Star Witness “Did You Have a Hallucination?” Sigelman
Pleads Guilty to Substantially Reduced Charges, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 16, 2015),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/after-judge-asks-dojs-star-witness-did-you-have-a-hallucinationsigelman-pleads-guilty-to-substantially-reduced-charges/. (containing links to original source
documents).
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See In Sentencing Sigelman, Judge Irenas Blasts the DOJ, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 17,
2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/in-sentencing-sigelman-judge-irenas-blasts-the-doj/.
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If your only source of FCPA information were the DOJ, you would be in the dark
about the above dynamics from the Sigelman trial because the DOJ’s press release
announcing Sigelman’s plea did not mention them. 153 However, less biased and more
sophisticated observers recognized full well that the DOJ had suffered yet another
FCPA trial court debacle. For instance, Paul Calli, a lawyer who previously
prevailed on behalf of a client in an FCPA trial, stated:
Make no mistake: this is a loss for the government and a win for Mr.
Sigelman.
....
[The DOJ’s press release is not only] silly [but] it is also offensive to the
spirit of justice. The release is written as though all the things that went
badly at trial for DOJ never happened. It fails to mention the lies of the
cooperator whom the government had decided to embrace. In doing so, it
is a clear demonstration that the DOJ press office does not exist to inform
the public, but to serve as the propaganda arm of DOJ. 154
Likewise, FCPA practitioners at Miller Chevalier stated:
The DOJ’s prosecution and trial of Joseph Sigelman deserves special
notice, as it was the DOJ’s first trial of an individual on FCPA charges
since the acquittal in January 2012 of John Joseph O’Shea. Sigelman’s
trial . . . lasted nine days and ended with prosecutors entering into a
negotiated guilty plea with Sigelman on only one of the six counts with
which he was charged after a key government witness admitted to lying
on the stand. Sigelman’s sentence of probation with no imprisonment was
essentially a victory for Sigelman, and the judge was particularly critical
of the government’s key witness as well as its sentencing
recommendation. The trial adds to a string of recent FCPA prosecutions
involving individuals in which the government has failed to secure a
conviction or its recommended sentence, highlighting the difficulties the
DOJ has sometimes encountered when forced to bear its burden of proof
in court.155
The DOJ further stumbled in 2015 when a judge substantially trimmed its
criminal charges against Lawrence Hoskins, a foreign national criminally charged
for allegedly authorizing improper payments to alleged Indonesian officials. 156

Press Release, DOJ, Former Chief Executive Officer of Oil Services Company Pleads
Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charge (June 15, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/formerchief-executive-officer-oil-services-company-pleads-guilty-foreign-bribery-charge.
153

154 Silly DOJ Press Release Belies Government’s Failure in Joseph Sigelman FCPA
Prosecution, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 1, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/silly-doj-pressrelease-belies-governments-failure-in-joseph-sigelman-fcpa-prosecution/.
155 FPCA
Summer Review 2015, MILLER & CHEVALIER (July 15, 2015),
http://www.millerchevalier.com/Publications/MillerChevalierPublications?find=150501.
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Unlike his co-defendants who pleaded guilty, Hoskins elected to put the DOJ to its
burden of proof and in pre-trial briefing argued that the indictment charged “a legally
invalid theory” by suggesting that he “could be criminally liable for conspiracy to
violate the FCPA even if the evidence [did] not establish that he was subject to
criminal liability as a principal, by being an ‘agent’ of a ‘domestic concern.’” 157 The
issue as stated by the court was:
whether a nonresident foreign national could be subject to criminal
liability under the FCPA, even where he is not an agent of a domestic
concern and does not commit acts while physically present in the territory
of the United States, under a theory of conspiracy or aiding and abetting a
violation of the FCPA by a person who is within the statute’s reach. 158
The court held, “Based on the text and structure of the FCPA and the legislative
history accompanying its enactment and its amendment . . . that Congress did not
intend to impose accomplice liability on non-resident foreign nationals who were not
subject to direct liability.”159
FCPA practitioners at King & Spalding rightly observed the following regarding
the DOJ’s setback in Hoskins:
[T]he Government argued for an accomplice theory, consistent with the
Resource Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. . . . The District
Court rejected that theory, based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Gebardi v. United States, which established that whenever Congress has
intentionally excluded certain individuals from liability for a specific law,
this congressional intent must not be circumvented by prosecuting such
individuals based on accomplice liability. While the District Court
rejected accomplice liability as an additional basis for FCPA jurisdiction,
it remains to be seen how other courts will address this question, and
whether the DOJ and the SEC will revisit their guidance on the matter.
Given the rarity of written judicial opinions interpreting the FCPA, this
ruling is likely to have an outsized impact on future FCPA enforcement
actions.160
The Sigelman and Hoskins matters were not the only notable DOJ enforcement
actions in 2015 in which the DOJ struggled. Two other cases from 2015 relevant to
FCPA enforcement were also noteworthy.
In United States v. Vassilieve, the DOJ criminally charged two foreign nationals
for allegedly providing money and other things of value to an executive of the
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-senior-executive-french-power-company-chargedconnection-foreign-bribery-scheme.
157 See Judge Trims DOJ’s FCPA Enforcement Action Against Lawrence Hoskins, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Aug. 17, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/judge-trims-dojs-fcpa-enforcementaction-against-lawrence-hoskins/.
158
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160 DOJ Loses Argument for FCPA Jurisdiction Based Merely on Accessory Liability, KING
&
SPALDING
(Sept.
1,
2015),
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/ca090115b.pdf.
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International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations agency
responsible for standardizing machine-readable passports.161 The DOJ’s indictment
did not contain any U.S. jurisdictional allegations, and, likely because of this, the
bribery scheme was not charged as an FCPA offense. 162 Even so, the conduct was in
the same general space and “the indictment alleged that the U.S. was a member of
ICAO and provided support to ICAO by, among other things, annual monetary
contributions.”163 Presumably on the basis of this allegation, the DOJ charged the
defendants with, among other things, conspiracy to solicit and to give bribes
involving a federal program, soliciting bribes involving a federal program, and
giving bribes involving a federal program. 164
The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment and argued it was “a most
unusual indictment. It levels charges against foreign nationals and is based solely on
foreign conduct. The indictment candidly states that the alleged offenses were
committed in their entirety outside the United States.” 165
The court granted the motion to dismiss and the judge’s comments from the
bench should be of an interest to anyone interested in extraterritorial application of
U.S. law. In pertinent part, the judge stated:
My first reaction in reading this indictment is that your office is to be
congratulated because, apparently, you have reduced crime in the
Northern District of California, and indeed in the United States of
America, to such a point that you are using resources of your office to go
after criminal activity that occurs in foreign countries and for that—that’s
a rather interesting concept that, apparently, you thought this is a good use
of assets and resources of the United States Attorney’s Office for the
Northern District of California.
....
And I never in my life, in 50 years of criminal practice, seen a more
misguided prosecution as the one that you’ve brought. I just don’t even
get it. I don’t get it, how you can—how you can use resources of the
United States Attorney’s Office to prosecute some foreign nationals
involved in a foreign company, engaged in conduct which was foreign, on

161 See The DOJ Gets Benchslapped in Foreign Bribery Case, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 23,
2015),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/the-doj-gets-benchslapped-in-foreign-bribery-case/
[hereinafter The DOJ Gets Benchslapped].

Although ICAO officials would likely be “foreign officials” under the FCPA, as it
related to the foreign national defendants charged, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions contain
the following jurisdictional element: “while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any
other act in furtherance” of a bribery scheme. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2016) (requiring that
persons subject to the statute are “in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in
furtherance” of a bribery scheme).
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See The DOJ Gets Benchslapped, supra note 161.
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doing things that weren’t directly related to the contribution of the United
States to that entity.166
The final notable instance of judicial scrutiny—albeit foreign judicial scrutiny—
of DOJ enforcement in 2015 occurred in a high-profile FCPA enforcement action
against Dmitry Firtash, a wealthy Ukrainian businessman with alleged ties to Russia,
who was criminally charged along with others in an alleged bribery scheme
involving Indian officials to secure mining licenses.167 Upon being criminally
charged by U.S. law enforcement, coincidentally during the same general timeframe
that U.S. relations with Russia escalated due to a conflict in Ukraine, Firtash stated
that the charges were “completely absurd and unfounded” and that “it [was] apparent
that [the action], including the US extradition request, [was] politically
motivated.”168 The first step in the DOJ’s enforcement action was to seek Firtash’s
extradition from Austria where he was arrested.169 However, an Austrian judge
refused the DOJ’s request to extradite Firtash and called the case against him
“politically motivated” and lacking “sufficient proof.”170
In short, while the DOJ’s modern FCPA enforcement program has been
successful in exercising leverage against risk averse business organizations to secure
settlement amounts through resolution vehicles not subjected to any meaningful
judicial scrutiny, 2015 again witnessed several DOJ struggles when put to its burden
of proof in the context of an adversarial system. As noted by FCPA practitioner
Michael Levy:
We’ve seen several trials in which the judges have been skeptical, if not
outwardly hostile, to some of the government’s more aggressive
interpretations of the FCPA. While those trials may have fallen apart for
other reasons, that skepticism still played, I believe, a substantial role.
Without the development of the law through judicial decisions, it’s very
unclear what judges believe the FCPA means compared to what the DOJ
think the FCPA means.171
C. Policy Pronouncements and Developments Relevant to FCPA Issues
While 2015 DOJ FCPA enforcement was substantially down compared to prior
years, as highlighted in this section 2015 was nevertheless an active year from the
standpoint of the DOJ articulating to the corporate community what they think the
FCPA means or otherwise outlining policy positions relevant to FCPA issues.
166
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See Press Release, DOJ, Six Defendants Indicted in Alleged Conspiracy to Bribe
Government Officials in India to Mine Titanium Minerals (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-defendants-indicted-alleged-conspiracy-bribe-governmentofficials-india-mine-titanium [hereinafter Six Defendants Indicted].
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168 An Address by Dmitry Firtash, GROUP DF (Apr. 3, 2014), https://groupdf.com/en/presscenter/news/an-address-by-dmitry-firtash/.
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Six Defendants Indicted, supra note 167.

See David M. Herszenhorn, Judge Rebuffs U.S. in Rejecting Extradition of Ukraine
Billionaire,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
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2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/01/world/europe/dmitry-v-firtash-extradition.html?_r=3.
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The year started in a most curious fashion as prior FCPA enforcement critic and
reform advocate Andrew Weissmann was named head of the DOJ’s Fraud Section. 172
Understanding Weissmann’s previous positions put into clear focus many of the
DOJ’s policy pronouncements in 2015 relevant to FCPA issues and thus, his
positions are set forth below in detail.
In 2010, Weissmann was the lead author of Restoring Balance: Proposed
Amendments to the FCPA, an advocacy piece written on behalf of the U.S. Chamber
Institute for Legal Reform.173 Publication of Restoring Balance soon led to a Senate
FCPA reform hearing in November 2010 and thereafter a House FCPA reform
hearing in June 2011.174 In Restoring Balance, Weissmann stated:
In spite of this rise in enforcement and investigatory action, judicial
oversight and rulings on the meaning of the provisions of the FCPA is still
minimal. Commercial organizations are rarely positioned to litigate an
FCPA enforcement action to its conclusion, and the risk of serious jail
time for individual defendants has led most to seek favorable terms from
the government rather than face the expense and uncertainty of a trial.
Thus, the primary statutory interpretive function is still being performed
almost exclusively by the DOJ Fraud Section and the SEC. Notably, these
enforcement agencies have been increasingly aggressive in their reading
of the law. The DOJ has expressed its approach primarily through its
opinion releases, but also in its decisions as to what FCPA enforcement
actions to pursue. Many commentators have expressed concern that the
DOJ effectively serves as both prosecutor and judge in the FCPA context,
because it both brings FCPA charges and effectively controls the
disposition of the FCPA cases it initiates.175
Using phrases such as “how far the DOJ has pressed the limits of enforcement,”
“DOJ’s aggressive pursuit” of companies as an “indication of how far the DOJ is
willing to expand the scope of FCPA enforcement,” and “the highly aggressive
stance the DOJ is taking to expand the FCPA net beyond its borders,”176 Weissmann
stated:
The current FCPA enforcement environment has been costly to business.
Businesses enmeshed in a full-blown FCPA investigation conducted by
the U.S. government have and will continue to spend enormous sums on
legal fees, forensic accounting, and other investigative costs before they
are even confronted with a fine or penalty, which . . . can range into the
172 Press Release, DOJ, Andrew Weissmann Selected as Chief of Criminal Division’s
Fraud Section (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/andrew-weissmann-selectedchief-criminal-divisions-fraud-section-0.
173 See ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS
TO
THE
FOREIGN
CORRUPT
PRACTICES
ACT
1
(2010),
http://www.millerchevalier.com/portalresource/RestoringBalance.

See generally House Hearing—Overview and Observations, FCPA PROFESSOR,
http://fcpaprofessor.com/house-hearing-overview-and-observations/. (last visited Oct. 30,
2016).
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tens or hundreds of millions. In fact, one noteworthy innovation in FCPA
enforcement policy has been the effective outsourcing of investigations by
the government to the private sector, by having companies suspected of
FCPA violations shoulder the cost of uncovering such violations
themselves through extensive internal investigations.
From the government’s standpoint, it is the best of both worlds. The costs
of investigating FCPA violations are borne by the company and any
resulting fines or penalties accrue entirely to the government. For
businesses, this arrangement means having to expend significant sums on
an investigation based solely on allegations of wrongdoing and, if
violations are found, without any guarantee that the business will receive
cooperation credit for conducting an investigation. 177
Elsewhere in Restoring Balance, Weissmann argued:
[T]he FCPA should be modified to make clear what is and what is not a
violation. The statute should take into account the realities that confront
businesses that operate in countries with endemic corruption (e.g., Russia,
which is consistently ranked by Transparency International as among the
most corrupt in the world) or in countries where many companies are
state-owned (e.g., China) and it therefore may not be immediately
apparent whether an individual is considered a “foreign official” within
the meaning of the act. As the U.S. government has not prohibited U.S.
companies from engaging in business in such countries, a company that
chooses to engage in such business faces unique hurdles. The FCPA
should incentivize the company to establish compliance systems that will
actively discourage and detect bribery, but should also permit companies
that maintain such effective systems to avail themselves of an affirmative
defense to charges of FCPA violations. This is so because in such
countries even if companies have strong compliance systems in place, a
third-party vendor or errant employee may be tempted to engage in acts
that violate the business’s explicit anti-bribery policies. It is unfair to hold
a business criminally liable for behavior that was neither sanctioned by or
known to the business. The imposition of criminal liability in such a
situation does nothing to further the goals of the FCPA; it merely creates
the illusion that the problem of bribery is being addressed, while the
parties that actually engaged in bribery often continue on, undeterred and
unpunished. The FCPA should instead encourage businesses to be vigilant
and compliant.
For this reason, and given the current state of enforcement, the FCPA
is ripe for much needed clarification and reform through improvements to
the existing statute. Such improvements, which are best suited for
Congressional action, are aimed at providing more certainty to the
business community when trying to comply with the FCPA, while
promoting efficiency and enhancing public confidence in the integrity of
the free market system as well as the underlying principles of our criminal
justice system.178
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On behalf of the U.S. Chamber, Weissmann also testified at the November 2010
Senate hearing. In his written testimony, Weissmann stated:
The FCPA had been tailored to balance various competing interests, but
that balance has been altered, at times, by aggressive application and
interpretations of the statute by the government. Instead of serving the
original intent of the statute, which was to punish companies that
participate in foreign bribery, actions taken under more expansive
interpretations of the statute may ultimately punish corporations whose
connection to improper acts is attenuated at best and nonexistent at worst.
The result is that the FCPA, as it currently written and implemented,
leaves corporations vulnerable to civil and criminal penalties for a wide
variety of conduct that is in many cases beyond their control and
sometimes even their knowledge. It also exposes businesses to predatory
follow-on civil suits that often get filed in the wake of a FCPA
enforcement action. In fact, there is reason to believe that the FCPA has
made U.S. businesses less competitive than their foreign counterparts who
do not have significant FCPA exposure. 179
In concluding his written testimony, Weissmann stated:
The recent dramatic increase in FCPA enforcement, coupled with the lack
of judicial oversight, has created significant uncertainty among the
American business community about the scope of the statute. In addition,
some of the enforcement actions brought by the SEC and DOJ are not
commensurate with the original goals of the FCPA, in that they fail to
reach the true bad actors and instead assign criminal liability to corporate
entities with attenuated or non-existent connections to potential FCPA
violations.180
During the hearing, Weissmann stated:
One of the reasons it is important to have a clearer statute, particularly in
the FCPA arena, is that corporations cannot typically take the risk of
going to trial and, thus, there is a dearth of legal rulings on the provisions
of the FCPA as it applies to organizations. Thus, the government’s
interpretation can be the first and the last word on the scope of the statute
as it applies to a company. The lack of judicial oversight, expansive
government interpretation of the FCPA, and the increased enforcement
that you heard about from [the DOJ witness] have led to considerable
concern and uncertainty about how and when the FCPA applies to
overseas business activities.181
179 Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the S.
Subcomm. On Crime and Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1005 (2010)
(written testimony of Andrew Weissmann, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Inst.
for Legal Reform), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/10252011weissmann_testimony.pdf.
180
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https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/6

32

2017]

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

189

During the hearing, Senator Arlen Specter asked Weismann: “Overall, do you
think that the act is fairly well balanced and fairly well enforced or too tough?” 182
Weissmann responded:
I think there is no question that many of the cases that were brought
up today, such as Siemens, fall far, far, far into the—that it is amply
warranted for the application of the statute. The problem is that every
company in America and many companies overseas worry about the
statute daily. And so regardless of what the Department of Justice is
doing, people think about the statute and could their conduct fall on one
side of it versus the other and will they be subject to an investigation. So
it is a difficult question to answer, because I have seen many prosecutions
where you say, of course, that seems like a just result and should have
been warranted, but there are many companies that are hurt by the
ambiguities in the statute and what I think is the over-breadth of some of
its provisions on a daily basis. 183
Beyond the FCPA, Weissmann has also been a vocal advocate of reforming
corporate criminal liability principles. In Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability,
Weissmann challenged traditional notions of corporate criminal liability and argued
that when the DOJ seeks to charge a corporation as a defendant, the government
should bear the burden of establishing as an additional element that the corporation
failed to have reasonably effective policies and procedures to prevent the conduct. 184
When Weissmann became the head of the DOJ’s Fraud Section in January 2015,
some were dismissive of his previous FCPA positions and comments. For instance,
in connection with her Senate confirmation, then Attorney General Nominee Loretta
Lynch was specifically asked about Weissmann being “an outspoken critic of DOJ’s
FCPA program.”185 Lynch stated, “It is my understanding that Mr. Weissmann made
these comments while in private practice and in connection with his representation
of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform.” 186 Lynch’s response was a dodge
and conveniently ignored that Weissmann, in his personal capacity, challenged
traditional notions of corporate criminal liability.187 Moreover, public reports
and-reform-advocate-selected-as-new-doj-fraud-section-chief/
[hereinafter
FCPA
Enforcement Critic] (quoting Andrew Weissmann, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime
and Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. Senate, 111th Congress, 2d Sess. (2010)
(transcript available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg66921/pdf/CHRG111shrg66921.pdf)).
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184 Id. (quoting Andrew Weissmann & David Newmann, Rethinking Corporate Criminal
Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 414 (2007)).

Loretta E. Lynch, Nomination of Loretta E. Lynch to be Attorney General of the United
States, Questions for the Record: Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (2015)
(transcript available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Lynch%20QFR%2029-15.pdf).
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See In the FCPA Space, Who Speaks for Whom?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 10, 2015),
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suggested that “a person familiar with Weissmann’s thinking said he viewed most of
his [FCPA] congressional testimony as giving his personal views rather than doing
work for a client.”188
At the very least, Weissmann’s previous FCPA comments shine a light on a
reoccurring issue, involving individuals like Weissmann who move in and out of
government service, of whether any genuine or legitimate beliefs are being
articulated by people who are willing to be held accountable.
As Weissmann correctly noted during his Senate FCPA testimony, a hallmark of
modern FCPA inquiries is business organizations often spending “enormous sums on
legal fees, forensic accounting, and other investigative costs before they are even
confronted with a fine or penalty, which . . . can range into the tens or hundreds of
millions.”189 Indeed, as highlighted by the below examples, pre-enforcement action
professional fees and expenses typically exceed, often by a wide margin, settlement
amounts in an FCPA enforcement action. 190
For instance, Avon resolved an FCPA enforcement action concerning alleged
conduct in China by agreeing to a $135 million settlement. 191 Yet, the most notable
aspect of Avon’s FCPA scrutiny was the approximate $500 million the company
spent on pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses. 192 The DOJ’s
resolution document contained the following unusual statement:
The Department also considered that the Company, taking into account its
own business interests, expended considerable resources on a company
wide review of and enhancements to its compliance program and internal
controls. While the Company’s efforts in this regard were taken without
Department request or guidance, and at times caused unintended delays in
the progress of the Department’s narrower investigations, the Department
recognizes that the Company’s efforts resulted in important compliance
and internal controls improvements. 193
Avon’s ratio of pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses to settlement
amount paled in comparison to the ratio in connection with the FCPA scrutiny of
Hyperdynamics. Specifically, the company resolved an FCPA enforcement action

188 Robert Schmidt, U.S.’s New Fraud Chief Will Enforce Laws He Was Paid to Blunt,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-27/u-s-snew-fraud-chief-will-enforce-laws-he-was-paid-to-blunt.
189

WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 173, at 5.

190

See infra note 192.

Press Release, DOJ, Avon China Pleads Guilty to Violating the FCPA by Concealing
More Than $8 Million in Gifts to Chinese Officials (Dec. 17, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/avon-china-pleads-guilty-violating-fcpa-concealing-more-8million-gifts-chinese-officials.
191

192 See Tom Schoenberg & David Voreacos, Avon Bribe-Probe Tab Neared $500 Million
as
Sales
Slumped,
BLOOMBERG
(May
2,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-02/avon-bribe-probe-tab-neared-500million-as-sales-slumped.
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concerning alleged conduct in Guinea by agreeing to a $75,000 settlement. 194 Yet,
the company’s annual report stated that it incurred $12.7 million in “legal and other
professional fees associated with the FCPA investigations”—an astonishing 170:1
ratio.195 During an investor conference call shortly after resolution of the
enforcement action, company executives stated:
Speaking of legal fees I do want to address the fees we incurred during
the FCPA investigation. As you know, we spent $12 MM from inception
to closure of that investigation. We were unhappily aware that FCPA
investigations can take years to conclude . . . This came at a very heavy
legal cost to say the least.196
Hyperdynamics executives (and shareholders) should be unhappy and should ask
some serious questions because, in the eyes of many, pre-enforcement action
professional fees and expenses have spiraled out of control, and FCPA scrutiny often
becomes a boondoggle for FCPA Inc. participants involved in a matter. 197
Against this backdrop, Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell delivered a
2015 speech in which she made the following notable observation:
All too often, criticism is leveled against the Justice Department for
purportedly causing companies to spend years, and many millions of
dollars, investigating potential violations. This is particularly true in the
FCPA context where the need for international evidence can add to the
expense and burden of an investigation. Critics wrongly question the
wisdom of disclosing misconduct and cooperating with the government in
light of what they perceive to be the department’s requirement that
companies then must conduct unnecessarily costly, time consuming and
widespread investigations.
There is no question that some cooperating companies spend large sums
of money investigating potential misconduct and correcting internal
controls issues that allowed the misconduct to occur. The decision to
incur those costs, however, is one made by those companies, not a
requirement of the department. When a company chooses to cooperate
194 Hyperdynamics Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 76006 (Sept. 29, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-76006.pdf.
195 Hyperdynamics
Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Sept.
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/HDY/786556382x0xS1047469-157344/937136/filing.pdf.

16,

2015),

196 Hyperdynamics
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 19,
http://investors.hyperdynamics.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1104659-16-90284.

2016),

197 See, e.g., Steven Pearlstein, Cashing in on Corruption, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/24/AR2008042403461.html. See
generally
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Anti-Bribery
Business,
THE
ECONOMIST
(May
9,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21650557-enforcement-laws-against-corporate-briberyincreases-there-are-risks-it-may-go; Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket, FORBES (June 7, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washington-extortion-mendelsohnbribery-racket.html; Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2012)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443862604578028462294611352.
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with the government, the manner in which the company approaches its
cooperation, and its own investigation of the conduct, can significantly
affect the length of the investigation and the costs incurred by the
company.
Although we expect internal investigations to be thorough, we do not
expect companies to aimlessly boil the ocean. Indeed, there have been
some instances in which companies have, in our view, conducted overly
broad and needlessly costly investigations, in some cases delaying our
ability to resolve matters in a timely fashion.
For example, if a company discovers an FCPA violation in one country,
and has no basis to suspect that violations are occurring elsewhere, we
would not necessarily expect it to extend its investigation beyond the
conduct in that country. On the other hand, if the same people involved in
the violation also operated in other countries, we likely would expect the
investigation to be broader.
This example is not intended to suggest the proper scope of an
investigation of any given matter. My point instead is that, to receive
cooperation credit, we expect companies to conduct appropriately tailored
investigations designed to root out misconduct, identify wrongdoers and
provide all available facts. To the extent a company decides to conduct a
broader survey of its operations, that decision, and any attendant delay
and cost, are the result of the company’s choices, not the department’s
requirement.198
Caldwell’s statement about pre-enforcement action professional fees and
expenses, a sensitive topic because it implicitly calls into question the decisions and
motivations of FCPA Inc. participants, set off a war-of-words in the FCPA space.
For instance, “defense attorneys . . . balked at the idea that they’re spending too
much time or money on investigations they’re conducting in large part for the
government’s sake, saying they’re not willfully adding unnecessary work to an
FCPA probe.”199
Most notably, Paul Pelletier (former Principal Deputy Chief of the Criminal
Division’s Fraud Section) stated:
Somewhat surprisingly . . . Caldwell seemed to place the blame for the
arduousness of government FCPA investigations squarely on companies
for “spend[ing] years, and many millions of dollars, investigating
potential violations. . . . As an initial observation, it remains an
unavoidable fact that companies simply are not incentivized to incur
198 Press Release, DOJ, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell Delivers Remarks at
New York University Law School’s Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement
(Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-rcaldwell-delivers-remarks-new-york-university-law.
199 Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Mixed Messages On Internal FCPA Probes Exasperate Attys,
LAW360 (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/646370/mixed-messages-oninternal-fcpa-probes-exasperate-attys.
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substantial costs by acting needlessly in the conduct of those internal
inquiries. Moreover, while it may be true that, on occasion, a company
has “boiled the ocean” in the conduct of an internal investigation, the
notion that federal investigators would routinely permit an “aimless”
internal inquiry to negatively affect the course or duration of the
government’s investigation is, at base, unconvincing. 200
Caldwell quickly shot-back when asked about companies that “wrack up massive
legal bills and do massive worldwide investigations” by saying, “That’s not us.
That’s the companies.”201 Regardless of who is at fault for the extent of preenforcement action professional fees and expenses in a typical instance of FCPA
scrutiny, the fact remains that such expenses are often the most serious hit to the
bottom-line of a company under FCPA scrutiny. 202
As Assistant Attorney General Caldwell rightly recognized, the time it takes to
resolve FCPA scrutiny is often intertwined with the expense of FCPA scrutiny.
Legal scrutiny—whether in the FCPA context or otherwise—is a cloud hanging over
a business organization. When the legal scrutiny can result in potential criminal
liability, the cloud is black or at the very least gray. For many companies, the cloud
of FCPA scrutiny simply lasts too long. 203 Indeed, the alleged conduct in many
corporate enforcement actions occurred 5-7 years, 7-10 years, and in some instances,
10-15 years prior to the enforcement action.204 What makes this dynamic particularly
troubling is that even the DOJ has long voiced concerns about protracted
investigations. For instance, in 2005 then DOJ Assistant Attorney General
Christopher Wray stated, “Simply put, speed matters in corporate fraud
investigations. The days of five-year investigations, of agreement after agreement
tolling the statute of limitations—while ill-gotten gains are frittered away and
investor confidence sinks—are increasingly a thing of the past.”205
The gray cloud of scrutiny most certainly is not a thing of the past and in 2015
needed attention was focused on this troubling aspect of FCPA enforcement. As

Paul E. Pelletier, Getting Real: FCPA Investigations Shouldn’t ‘Boil the Ocean’, FCPA
BLOG (May 11, 2015, 9:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/5/11/getting-real-fcpainvestigations-shouldnt-boil-the-ocean.html.
200

201 Joel Schectman, DOJ Wants Faster Anti-Bribery Investigations, Too, WALL ST. J. (May
19, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/05/19/doj-wants-faster-anti-briberyinvestigations-too/.
202 See
Friday
Roundup,
FCPA
http://fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-152/.

PROFESSOR

(Feb.

20,

2015),

203 See The Gray Cloud of FCPA Scrutiny Simply Lasts Too Long, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept.
9, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-gray-cloud-of-fcpa-scrutiny-simply-lasts-too-long
(containing discussion of specific examples).
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Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Div., Remarks to the ABA
White Collar Crime Luncheon (Feb. 25, 2005) (transcript available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1031/INVN0401/2005628_r17d_04CV3181.pdf).
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often is the case, a vocal critic was a former senior DOJ official. 206 In a Wall Street
Journal editorial titled “The Foreign Bribery Sinkhole at Justice,” Pelletier wrote:
Absurdly long and costly investigations . . . may cause companies to
reassess the value of reporting FCPA violations to the federal
government.
When bribery investigations are publicly resolved in a timely fashion,
other businesses can more readily identify ongoing bribery schemes
operating within their industry or region and ensure that their anti-bribery
compliance programs adequately address those current schemes. That
opportunity is lost when criminal resolutions drag out for five or more
years. Deterrence then is principally the size of the monetary penalty.
The Justice Department needs to do more than churn out resolutions to
foreign bribery cases notable only for their record-breaking penalties.
Rigorous and prompt FCPA enforcement can have a dramatic impact on
the insidious and corrosive effect of corruption overseas and provide . . .
restorative justice.207
Given Pelletier’s former DOJ position, his insight on this issue is notable and is
thus set forth below in more detail. In a follow-up article, Pelletier further observed:
[T]he pattern of costly delay in FCPA investigations continues unabated.
While every government investigation and resolution poses unique facts
and circumstances that may serve to delay the investigatory process, these
recent long-developing FCPA resolutions . . . are convincingly
problematic. The staggering investigative costs, ultimately borne by
employees and shareholders alike . . . also can reach unconscionable
levels.208
Countering the DOJ’s assertion that the delay in many FCPA investigations is
due to the complexity of obtaining foreign evidence, Pelletier argued:
[This explanation] fails to explain the more than twofold increase in
investigatory durations from historical norms.
A dispassionate,
experience-based analysis of this overly broad assertion exposes a faulty
premise. Simply put, the DOJ can and must do better.
....
With a cooperating corporation, FCPA investigators routinely find
themselves in the unique position of having prompt access to overseas
206 See, e.g., A Former Enforcement Official is Likely to Say (Or Has Already Said) the
Same Thing, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-formerenforcement-official-is-likely-to-say-or-has-already-said-the-same-thing.

Paul Pelletier, The Foreign-Bribery Sinkhole at Justice, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-foreign-bribery-sinkhole-at-justice-1429572436.
207

208 Paul Pelletier, Lengthy and Costly FCPA Investigations Disserve Both Business and
Justice,
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BLOG
(May
22,
2015),
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evidence and witnesses without a need to resort to cumbersome
international treaty requests. Such cooperation is much like the
prosecution having secured a cooperator with unfettered access to the
critical evidence.
....
Regardless of the reason or reasons for these protracted investigations,
both the continued vitality of the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement efforts and
the prominence of the United States as the global leader of anti-corruption
enforcement would seem to demand a renewed effort to dramatically
reduce the time frame necessary to achieve resolution.209
Pelletier next rightly highlighted the many benefits of prompt law enforcement.
Legitimate enterprises benefit from those kinds of real-time
revelations, and criminal political regimes can be immediately identified
and deterred. Moreover, when a criminal resolution discloses and
punishes criminal conduct that occurred five or more years earlier, any
deterrent effect of the resolution is significantly diminished. This is
particularly true in industries where the overseas corrupt conduct
flourishes with abandon.
At that late stage, the principal deterrent effect is relegated to the size
of the monetary penalty—something the DOJ continues to emphasize
with all too much frequency and relish. As recent cases have
demonstrated, lengthy FCPA investigations also place untenably wasteful
financial burdens on corporations, their employees and their shareholders.
Given that the DOJ’s FCPA unit within the Fraud Section has more
than doubled in size from 2009 to today and has been fortified by a
dedicated squad of FBI agents, it is puzzling that many of these
investigations seem to drag on interminably. The DOJ must strive to be
more than just “FCPA Inc.,” churning out stale resolutions notable only
for their record-breaking penalties.210
In conclusion, Pelletier stated:
The interests of justice are neither served nor advanced when FCPA
investigations routinely drag on for five or more years. Rigorous and
prompt FCPA enforcement with respect to current bribery schemes can
have a dramatic impact on the insidious and corrosive effect of corruption
overseas.
....
Curing the deficiencies that lead to costly and wasteful delays will require
a systemic and sustained effort, primarily by the DOJ. It will also require
a more focused approach by outside counsel. Although the ameliorative
benefits resulting from such change will not be achieved overnight, the
long-term vitality and efficacy of the DOJ’s anti-corruption enforcement
209

Id.

210

Id.
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efforts ultimately rests on the government’s ability to sustainably alter the
status quo.211
In short, the gray cloud of FCPA scrutiny simply lasts too long in the FCPA’s
modern era and results in a host of problematic policy issues as highlighted above. 212
Like several other problematic issues that define the FCPA’s modern era, blame for
the gray cloud is shared by the enforcement agencies as well as business
organizations subject to FCPA scrutiny (and their counsel). Simply put, cooperation
is often the name-of-the-game in most FCPA enforcement actions and the roll-overand-play-dead mentality of most companies, 213 which results in waiver of statute of
limitation defenses or execution of tolling agreements, has broad policy
consequences.214 If business organizations would actually mount bona fide legal
defenses in the face of FCPA scrutiny the FCPA’s modern era, including the
troubling gray cloud of scrutiny, would look much different. 215
Yet, the government also shares in the blame. As stated by Pelletier:
From 2002 through 2010, the average Criminal Division tenure of a Fraud
Section prosecutor exceeded 5 years and . . . during that same time frame,
the average duration of a foreign bribery investigation measured from the
last act of the offense to resolution was approximately 3 years.
Commentators have noted an increasingly high and troubling turnover
rate in the Fraud Section since 2010, radically altering the average tenure
of Section prosecutors. Moreover, since 2010 the average investigatory
duration of foreign bribery matters has doubled to more than six years.
Whatever explanation may be offered for these jaw dropping statistics, the
practical effect is that most FCPA investigations will be passed from
prosecutor to prosecutor, almost certainly leading to unnecessarily
protracted investigations.216
A final 2015 policy pronouncement relevant to FCPA enforcement was the
announcement of a new “compliance counsel” at the DOJ. 217 In terms of background,
a frequent criticism of the modern FCPA enforcement program is that the DOJ (and
SEC) fail to give proper credit to a company’s good faith efforts to comply with the
211

Id.

See The Foreign-Bribery Sinkhole at Justice, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 22, 2015),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/the-foreign-bribery-sinkhole-at-justice/.
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Paul Pelletier, Will the Yates Memo Further Delay Corporate FCPA Resolutions?,
FCPA BLOG (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/10/5/paul-pelletier-will-theyates-memo-further-delay-corporate-f.html.
216

See Editorial, Corporate Compliance Counsel Draws Mixed Reviews, Even State of the
Art Programs Can Turn Out to Be Corrupt, CORP. CRIME REP. (Aug. 5, 2015),
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FCPA when a single employee or small group of actors engage in conduct contrary
to the company’s pre-existing FCPA compliance policies and procedures.218 In such
situations, the enforcement agencies often hold the company liable for FCPA
violations based on respondeat superior principles in what amounts to strict
liability.219
This aspect of FCPA enforcement was a major topic in both the Senate’s 2010
FCPA hearing as well as the House’s 2011 FCPA hearing. 220 Against the backdrop
of several former high-ranking DOJ officials (including Weissmann) supporting an
FCPA compliance defense (a defense consistent with the FCPA-like laws of many
peer nations), the DOJ has remained defiant in its opposition to the concept, calling a
compliance defense, among other things, “novel and . . . risky” and that “the time is
not right” to consider it.221 In pertinent part, the DOJ has long maintained that an
actual FCPA statutory amendment setting forth a compliance defense is not
necessary because the DOJ already declines to prosecute business organizations for
FCPA violations under respondeat superior principles when, among other reasons,
the organization had pre-existing compliance policies and procedures, only a rogue
employee was involved in the improper conduct, or the improper conduct was
limited in scope.222
Accepting the DOJ’s statement as true, the fact remains that DOJ consideration
of pre-existing FCPA compliance policies and procedures is opaque, unpredictable,
and, in the minds of many, inconsistent.223 An actual FCPA compliance defense
would accomplish, among other things, the policy goal of removing factors relevant
to corporate criminal liability from the opaque, inconsistent, and unpredictable world
of DOJ decision making towards a more transparent, consistent, and predictable
model.224 Indeed, as Weissmann previously stated, improvements to the FCPA,
including a compliance defense, “are best suited for Congressional action.” 225
Presumably Weissmann encountered substantial political opposition to an actual
compliance defense along the lines he previously advocated for because, in the
minds of some, an FCPA compliance defense weakens the FCPA and creates a “race

See Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Jan.
18,
2012),
http://fcpaprofessor.com/revisiting-a-foreign-corrupt-practices-actcompliance-defense/.
218

219 See Friday Roundup, FCPA P ROFESSOR (Mar. 8, 2013), http://fcpaprofessor.com/fridayroundup-70/.

For an extended discussion of issues relevant to an FCPA compliance defense, see Mike
Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012 WIS. L. REV.
609 (2012).
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to the bottom.”226 Such criticism of course ignores both the fact that most peer
nations with FCPA-like laws have compliance defense concepts in their laws and the
many positive policy objectives that can be accomplished with a compliance
defense. Indeed, as Weissmann previously stated, the FCPA “should incentivize the
company to establish compliance systems that will actively discourage and detect
bribery.”227
Compliance is a cost center within business organizations and expenditure of
finite resources on FCPA compliance is an investment best sold if it can reduce legal
exposure, not merely lessen the impact of legal exposure. 228 Moreover, at present, the
incentives organizations have to adopt FCPA compliance policies and procedures
solely are to lessen the impact of legal exposure. These present incentives thus
represent “baby carrots” when what is needed to better incentivize more robust
FCPA compliance are real “carrots.” An FCPA compliance defense is a real “carrot”
that will better incentivize compliance across the business landscape. Organizations
with existing FCPA compliance policies and procedures will be incentivized to make
existing programs better. Likewise, organizations currently without stand-alone
FCPA policies and procedures will be incentivized to spend finite resources to
implement FCPA compliance policies and procedures.229
Against this relevant backdrop and the policy discussion surrounding an FCPA
compliance defense, in late 2015 the DOJ announced:
[T]he Department of Justice Fraud Section has retained Hui Chen as a
full-time compliance expert. She will report to Andrew Weissmann, the
Chief of the Fraud Section . . .
Among her duties as a consulting expert, Chen will provide expert
guidance to Fraud Section prosecutors as they consider the enumerated
factors in the United States Attorneys’ Manual concerning the prosecution
of business entities, including the existence and effectiveness of any
compliance program that a company had in place at the time of the
conduct giving rise to the prospect of criminal charges, and whether the
corporation has taken meaningful remedial action, such as the
implementation of new compliance measures to detect and prevent future
wrongdoing. Chen will help prosecutors develop appropriate benchmarks
for evaluating corporate compliance and remediation measures and
communicating with stakeholders in setting those benchmarks. Relatedly,
after a corporate resolution is reached requiring ongoing Fraud Section
assessments of a company’s compliance and remediation efforts, Chen
will provide expert guidance to help prosecutors and monitors evaluate

226

Strengthening, Not Weakening, supra note 224.
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FCPA Enforcement Critic, supra note 181.

SEC Enforcement Official Acknowledges the Underlying Logic Supporting a
Compliance Defense, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 16, 2013), http://fcpaprofessor.com/secenforcement-official-acknowledges-the-underlying-logic-supporting-a-compliance-defense/
(emphasis added).
228

229

Id. (emphasis added).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/6

42

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

2017]

199

whether the implementation of such measures is effective and in keeping
with the terms and purposes of Fraud Section resolutions. 230
At the same time, Assistant Attorney General Caldwell delivered a speech in
which she rhetorically asked, “What will the compliance counsel do?”231 and offered
the following:
She will help us evaluate each compliance program on a case-by-case
basis—just as the department always has—but with a more expert eye,
and she will work with our prosecutors to assess:
•
•

•
•

•

•

•

Does the institution ensure that its directors and senior managers
provide strong, explicit and visible support for its corporate
compliance policies?
Do the people who are responsible for compliance have stature
within the company? Do compliance teams get adequate funding
and access to necessary resources? Of course, we won’t expect
that a smaller company has the same compliance resources as a
Fortune-50 company.
Are the institution’s compliance policies clear and in writing?
Are they easily understood by employees? Are the policies
translated into languages spoken by the company’s employees?
Does the institution ensure that its compliance policies are
effectively communicated to all employees? Are its written
policies easy for employees to find? Do employees have repeated
training, which should include direction regarding what to do or
with whom to consult when issues arise?
Does the institution review its policies and practices to keep
them up to date with evolving risks and circumstances? This is
especially important if a U.S.-based entity acquires or merges
with another business, especially a foreign one.
Are there mechanisms to enforce compliance policies? Those
include both incentivizing good compliance and disciplining
violations. Is discipline even handed? The department does not
look favorably on situations in which low-level employees who
may have engaged in misconduct are terminated, but the more
senior people who either directed or deliberately turned a blind
eye to the conduct suffer no consequences. Such action sends the
wrong message—to other employees, to the market and to the
government—about the institution’s commitment to compliance.
Does the institution sensitize third parties like vendors, agents or
consultants to the company’s expectation that its partners are
also serious about compliance? This means more than including

Press Release, DOJ, New Compliance Counsel Expert Retained By the DOJ Fraud
Section (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download.
230

231 Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R.
Caldwell Speaks at SIFMA Compliance and Legal Soc’y N.Y. Reg’l Seminar (Nov. 2, 2015)
(transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-rcaldwell-speaks-sifma-compliance-and-legal-society).
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boilerplate language in a contract. It means taking action—
including termination of a business relationship—if a partner
demonstrates a lack of respect for laws and policies. And that
attitude toward partner compliance must exist regardless of
geographic location.232
To knowledgeable observers, Caldwell’s speech was nothing new. As Professor
Samuel Buell (a former DOJ prosecutor) stated:
So why does the Department of Justice need to appoint a special lawyer to
do the job of assessing what prosecutors have long assessed, especially
when that lawyer will be exercising the same broad discretion, with no
governing law, that federal prosecutors have been exercising up to now?
Will this lawyer have some particular expertise in the connection between
crime and corporate compliance efforts that other prosecutors have
lacked? If so, where will this expertise come from? It’s hard to see how
adding another person to the process of exercising existing discretion in
this area is really going to change the landscape much. 233
Indeed, rather than support Weissmann’s (and others) call for an FCPA
compliance defense and more broad revisions to corporate criminal liability, the
DOJ’s announcement of a compliance counsel position appears to be little more than
a public relations campaign that masks the underlying substantive issues.
As FCPA practitioner Derek Andreson rightly observed, “It’s a clever move
because it avoids the Justice Department having to confront a formal compliance
defense, which I think can be seen as giving bad incentives. And it gives them a
chance to push back on the criticism that they don’t place enough weight on
compliance efforts.”234
Even FCPA commentators that normally tilt towards DOJ positions were critical
of the compliance counsel position. For instance, FCPA practitioner Michael Volkov
(a former DOJ prosecutor) stated:
To suggest that [the DOJ] need[s] some assistance is just a little too
politically cute for me. As a former federal prosecutor, I am not so sure
that the position was really needed. In my mind, career prosecutors at the
Department and in US Attorneys’ Offices across the country are quite
familiar with these issues already and there does not seem to be a real
need for such compliance assistance. Federal prosecutors have more than
enough expertise in this area, and to suggest otherwise is a slap at the
professionalism and care that prosecutors bring to their jobs. 235
DOJ motivations aside, the new compliance counsel position was just one of
several notable DOJ policy pronouncements relevant to the FCPA discussed in this
232

Id.

233

Corporate Compliance Counsel Draws Mixed Reviews, supra note 217.

Joel Schectman, Compliance Counsel to Help DOJ Decide Whom to Prosecute, WALL
ST.
J.:
RISK
&
COMPLIANCE
J.
(July
30,
2015),
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/07/30/compliance-counsel-to-help-doj-decidewhom-to-prosecute/.
234

235

Corporate Compliance Counsel Draws Mixed Reviews, supra note 217.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/6

44

2017]

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

201

section. In short, 2015 was an interesting year from a policy perspective as FCPA
enforcement critic and reform advocate Weissmann assumed the head of the DOJ’s
Fraud Section.
D. Developments Beyond the FCPA
As highlighted above, 2015 was notable for its expansive and evolving FCPA
enforcement theories, judicial scrutiny of FCPA and related enforcement theories,
and policy pronouncements and developments relevant to FCPA issues. As
discussed in this section, 2015 also witnessed several notable developments beyond
the FCPA that nevertheless touch upon FCPA issues or are otherwise relevant to a
similar space.
1.

FCPA-Related Civil Litigation

Although courts have held that the FCPA does not provide a private right of
action,236 plaintiff lawyers representing shareholders frequently use instances of
FCPA scrutiny or the core facts from FCPA enforcement actions in civil suits. 237
Many of these cases are derivative actions in which a shareholder claims that officers
and directors breached fiduciary duties by allegedly allowing the company to operate
without sufficient FCPA compliance policies or procedures and/or not properly
monitoring and supervising those policies and procedures in place.238
A notable instance of FCPA scrutiny in recent years has involved Wal-Mart,239
and in connection with the company’s FCPA scrutiny, civil suits began to rain down
on the company and its current or former executive officers and board members. 240
Several of the civil suits were consolidated, and as summarized by the court, plaintiff
shareholders alleged that various individual defendants “breached their fiduciary
duties of loyalty and good faith by: (1) permitting violations of foreign and federal
laws and Wal-Mart’s code of ethics; (2) permitting the obstruction of an adequate
investigation of known potential (and/or actual) violations of foreign and federal
laws; and (3) covering up (or attempting to cover up) known potential (and/or actual)
violations of foreign and federal laws.” 241 In short, the complaint “consistently
implie[d] that Defendants should have or must have known about the alleged
236
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misconduct by virtue of their positions and the supposed reporting structure at WalMart.”242
Like the fate of many such FCPA-related civil suits, the suit was dismissed as the
court stated, “Nothing in the Complaint suggests any particularized basis to infer that
a majority of the Board had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged
misconduct, let alone that they acted improperly with scienter.”243
A second type of FCPA-related civil claim frequently brought in the aftermath of
FCPA scrutiny or enforcement is a securities fraud action. In such actions, plaintiff
shareholders allege that the company and various executive officers violate Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act by making false or misleading statements
concerning the company’s business and/or its compliance with the FCPA or related
laws.244
For instance, in connection with its FCPA scrutiny Hyperdynamics shareholders
brought such a claim.245 The shareholders alleged that the company’s prior
statements regarding FCPA compliance were false or misleading statements by
omission.246 The alleged FCPA violations occurred when the company made
“donations to the government of Guinea during three phases of negotiations”
concerning a project.247 However, the court dismissed the complaint and concluded,
“Plaintiffs have not alleged FCPA-related facts which would render either the
[disclosures] misleading by omission and which Defendants had a duty to disclose.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts which would render the specific
denials false or misleading.”248 In pertinent part, after reviewing the FCPA’s
statutory scheme, the court stated, “[The FCPA's anti-bribery provision] does not bar
a company from giving anything of value to a foreign government, as opposed to a
foreign official personally, or to a third party such as a nonprofit in order to generate
corporate goodwill, even if the gift indirectly influences government officials.”249
This was a notable statement in that it followed on the heels of the abovementioned BNY Mellon FCPA enforcement action,250 an action not subjected to any
judicial scrutiny, in which the SEC found that BNY Mellon violated the FCPA’s
242
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anti-bribery provisions by providing internships to family members of alleged
“foreign officials” because the internships “were valuable work experience[s], and
the requesting officials derived significant personal value in being able to confer this
benefit on their family members.”251
The above dichotomy demonstrates that FCPA issues often co-exist in two
parallel universes. One universe is ruled by all-powerful gods with big and sharp
sticks in which subjects would not dare challenge the gods.252 Another universe
consists of checks and balances in which independent actors call the balls and
strikes.253 The first universe refers to FCPA enforcement by the DOJ and SEC. The
second universe refers to litigation of FCPA-related claims in which judges make
decisions in the context of an adversarial legal system. 254 The second universe is
often referred to as the rule of law universe, and the above decision in the
Hyperdynamics case is telling for the reasons discussed above.255
A final FCPA-related civil litigation development from 2015 raises the question
of where the truth lies in FCPA enforcement. In other words, if the DOJ and/or SEC
make allegations in a FCPA enforcement action, and a risk-averse corporation agrees
to resolve the enforcement action in the absence of judicial scrutiny, does that mean
the allegations are true?256 As an FCPA-related civil suit against Hewlett-Packard
Co. (HP) demonstrates, the answer is not necessarily.
In terms of background, a component of the 2014 HP FCPA enforcement action
involved DOJ and SEC allegations concerning improper business conduct in
Mexico.257 Specifically, in a non-prosecution agreement, the DOJ alleged that HP
Mexico indirectly made cash payments to a Pemex Chief Information Officer in
order to obtain contracts and the SEC found the same in an administrative order. 258
Notably, neither resolution vehicle was subjected to any judicial scrutiny.
Interestingly, in the aftermath of the enforcement action, Pemex brought a civil
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claim against HP alleging that HP paid bribes to win the Pemex contracts. 259 In
defense, HP pointed to a Pemex annual report that stated:
On April 9, 2014, the SEC issued an order imposing sanctions against
Hewlett-Packard Company (or HP) based on its findings that HP’s
subsidiaries in Mexico, Russia and Poland made improper payments to
certain public officials in order to obtain public contracts in violation of
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In the case related to Mexico, the
sanctions related in part to allegations that [HP Mexico] paid a Mexican
information-technology and consulting company more than U.S. $1
million to win a software and licensing contract with [Pemex] worth
approximately U.S. $6 million. The SEC’s order alleged that a former
officer of [Pemex] received a portion of the HP subsidiary’s unlawful
payment to the consulting company. The Internal Control Body of
[Pemex] concluded its investigation after finding no improper payment. 260
The civil action against HP was ultimately dismissed. 261 So where does the truth
lie: did HP make an improper payment to a Pemex official or not? The public will
likely never know, but this much is true. The DOJ and SEC allegations, while
accepted by a risk averse company, were not subjected to any judicial scrutiny.
Moreover, there are no consequences to the DOJ and SEC should the allegations not
be accurate and there is no accountability for untrue statements. On the other hand,
Pemex’s statement was contained in an SEC filing and are thus statements to the
market actionable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for false or misleading
statements.262
2.

Historic Firsts in the U.K.

The U.S. is not the only country with a law prohibiting bribery of foreign
officials for a business purpose. For instance, in 2011 the U.K. Bribery Act
(“Bribery Act”) went into effect and this section highlights two historic firsts that
occurred in the U.K. in 2015.263
Prior to discussing these developments, this section provides relevant
background regarding the Bribery Act and its early enforcement. The Bribery Act
replaced a hodgepodge of antiquated U.K. bribery and corruption statutes that
generally required a “controlling mind” of a corporation (generally a member of the
board of directors or a high-ranking executive) to be involved in the alleged
improper conduct in order to criminally charge the entity. 264
259
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To bypass this general U.K. legal principle, the Bribery Act contains a so-called
“failure to prevent bribery offense” which provides that a commercial organization
will be subject to prosecution if a person associated with the corporation bribes
another person intending to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct
of business for that organization.265 However, the Bribery Act also contains a socalled “adequate procedures defense” which provides that a “commercial
organization will have a full defense if it can show that despite a particular case of
bribery it nevertheless had adequate procedures in place to prevent persons
associated with it from bribing.” 266 According to the U.K. Ministry of Justice
(“MOJ”), the adequate-procedures defense is included in the Bribery Act “to
encourage commercial organizations to put procedures in place to prevent bribery by
persons associated with them,”267 and “the objective of the Bribery Act is not to
bring the full force of the criminal law to bear upon well run commercial
organizations that experience an isolated incident of bribery on their behalf.” 268
Related to Bribery Act enforcement, in 2014 U.K. prosecutors gained
authorization to use deferred prosecution agreements to resolve alleged instances of
corporate fraud including Bribery Act offenses. 269 Even though the U.K. adopted a
DPA regime, it is materially different from the U.S. DPA regime in that the U.K.
regime contemplates active and early involvement by the judiciary. 270
Against this backdrop, two historic firsts occurred in the U.K. in a 2015
enforcement action against Standard Bank: (i) the first use of the so-called failure to
prevent bribery offense in a foreign bribery action and (ii) the first use of a deferred
prosecution agreement in the U.K.271
In terms of “what” was resolved in the $25 million Standard Bank (“SB”)
enforcement action—a violation of the Bribery Act’s failure to prevent bribery
offense—the key points from the enforcement action—all based on the Serious
Fraud Office’s272 charging document and/or the court’s judgment—were as follows.
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The enforcement action against SB was based on the conduct of its former
“sister company” (Stanbic Bank Tanzania Limited (ST)) and two former
employees at ST in relation to just one transaction. 273
The transaction was a private placement offering for the Government of
Tanzania (GOT).274
In connection with the transaction, SB connected due diligence on GOT and
the enforcement action found no fault in this regard. 275
However, the enforcement action faulted SB for not conducting effective
diligence on a local partner inserted into the transaction by ST.276
SB’s oversight in this regard was the result of an apparent misunderstanding
at SB based on—in the words of the SFO—“a reasonable interpretation” of
SB’s own written guidelines.277
The end result was that SB relied on ST to conduct due diligence and to
raise any concerns regarding the local partner. Indeed, the SFO alleged that
SB was provided a “two page checklist from ST of the steps it had taken” in
regards to due diligence of the local partner.278
SB’s alleged failure, however, was in allowing—and trusting—that its sister
company would conduct effective due diligence of a local partner in one
transaction.279
As stated by the Judge, “[T]he SFO has reached the conclusion that there is
insufficient evidence to suggest that any of Standard Bank’s employees
committed a [bribery] offence: whilst a payment of US $6 million was
made available to EGMA (the local partner), the evidence does not
demonstrate with the appropriate cogency that anyone within Standard
Bank knew that two senior executives of Stanbic intended the payment to
constitute a bribe, or so intended it themselves.”280
Elsewhere, the Judge repeated, “The evidence does not reveal that
executives or employees of Standard Bank intended or knew of an intention
to bribe.”281
The above-alleged conduct occurred against the backdrop of SB having—as
specifically highlighted in the resolution documents—various policies and
procedures designed to the same conduct giving rising to the enforcement
action.282
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Indeed, the SFO’s statement of facts contained an appendix titled “Training
Schedule and Interview Excerpts re Training & Awareness of Policies” and
identified—for three SB employees—extensive training courses and dates
completed.283
SB’s alleged failure also took place against the backdrop of—in the words
of the Judge—“Standard Bank [having] no previous convictions for bribery
and corruption nor has it been the subject of any other criminal
investigations by the SFO.”284
Moreover, the Judge stated, “[T]here is no evidence that the failure to raise
concerns about anti-bribery and corruption risks . . . was more widespread
within the organization.”285

In terms of “how” the enforcement action was resolved (the U.K.’s first DPA),
the judge who approved the DPA complimented SB’s voluntary disclosure and
cooperation and stated,
Standard Bank immediately reported itself to the authorities and adopted a
genuinely proactive approach to the matter . . . In this regard, the
promptness of the self-report and the extent to which the prosecutor has
been involved are to be taken into account . . . In this case, the disclosure
was within days of the suspicions coming to the Bank’s attention, and
before its solicitors had commenced (let alone completed) its own
investigation.
Credit must also be given for self-reporting which might otherwise have
remained unknown to the prosecutor. . . . In this regard, the trigger for the
disclosure was incidents that occurred overseas which were reported by
Stanbic’s employees to Standard Bank Group. Were it not for the internal
escalation and proactive approach of Standard Bank and Standard Bank
Group that led to self-disclosure, the conduct at issue may not otherwise
have come to the attention of the SFO.
....
Standard Bank fully cooperated with the SFO from the earliest possible
date by, among other things, providing a summary of first accounts of
interviewees, facilitating the interviews of current employees, providing
timely and complete responses to requests for information and material
and providing access to its document review platform. The Bank has
agreed to continue to cooperate fully and truthfully with the SFO and any
other agency or authority, domestic or foreign, as directed by the SFO, in
any and all matters relating to the conduct which is the subject matter of
the present DPA. Suffice to say, this self-reporting and cooperation

283
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Id. at 13 (containing links to the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, the Statement of
Facts, the preliminary judgment and full judgment).
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militates very much in favour of finding that a DPA is likely to be in the
interests of justice.286
In conclusion, the judge stated:
It is obviously in the interests of justice that the SFO has been able to
investigate the circumstances in which a UK registered bank acquiesced
in an arrangement (however unwittingly) which had many hallmarks of
bribery on a large scale and which both could and should have been
prevented. Neither should it be thought that, in the hope of getting away
with it, Standard Bank would have been better served by taking a course
which did not involve self report, investigation and provisional agreement
to a DPA with the substantial compliance requirements and financial
implications that follow. For my part, I have no doubt that Standard Bank
has far better served its shareholders, its customers and its employees (as
well as all those with whom it deals) by demonstrating its recognition of
its serious failings and its determination in the future to adhere to the
highest standards of banking. Such an approach can itself go a long way
to repairing and, ultimately, enhancing its reputation and, in consequence,
its business. It can also serve to underline the enormous importance which
is rightly attached to the culture of compliance with the highest ethical
standards that is so essential to banking in this country. 287
David Green (Director of the SFO) stated that the SB DPA was a “landmark
DPA [that] will serve as a template for future agreements” 288 Ben Morgan (Joint
Head of Bribery and Corruption at the SFO) applauded the conduct of SB and its
counsel and stated: “It is maybe strange for a prosecutor to say—but credit to the
parties involved for the way they have dealt with a corruption incident once it has
surfaced. The bank, certain of its employees and its advisers . . . have had the
courage to innovate where others will now follow.” 289
However, beyond the pomp and circumstance of the historic nature of the SB
action, it raises several important issues as the U.K. begins to enforce the Bribery
Act and begins to use DPAs. For instance, given the SFO’s allegations and judicial
findings, it is curious why SB even voluntarily disclosed the conduct at issue,
particularly in light of the Bribery Act’s adequate procedures defense. 290 In pertinent
part, the SB action would appear, based on the allegations, to be an instance where
an otherwise well-run commercial organization experienced an isolated instance of
bribery in its organization—a circumstance in which the U.K. MOJ previously said
was not the goal of the Bribery Act.291
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In short, the U.K.’s first use of the “failure to prevent bribery” offense seems
dubious (albeit with judicial blessing). As U.K. practitioner Eoin O’Shea observed:
The issue of whether the company might have had a defence of “adequate
procedures” to a section 7 charge was also considered by the court, albeit
briefly, when considering culpability. The discussion here is
disappointing because it focuses on the specific compliance problems
connected to the conduct in Tanzania, rather than whether there was an
effective anti-bribery policy or culture across the bank as a whole. I’m not
sure this is the right approach. When sentencing an organisation, it is
relevant to consider whether the misfeasance was a case of “a few bad
apples” or more widespread systemic failings.292
Likewise, practitioners at Gibson Dunn stated, “[A] number of important
elements of the [failure to prevent bribery] offence are not addressed in detail in [the
SB] judgment, and will remain a source of uncertainty for corporations in
considering their exposure under that offence.” 293
Yet, the first “failure to prevent bribery” enforcement action in the U.K. is
similar to several FCPA enforcement actions294 where the enforcement theory seems
to be, with the benefit of perfect hindsight, to zero in on one transaction (against the
universe of thousands of similar transactions) to find an FCPA violation in what
amounts to a “should have, could have, would have” theory of liability. 295
Relevant to SB’s disclosure, the resolution documents state, “The disclosure was
within days of the suspicions coming to the Bank’s attention, and before its solicitors
had commenced (let alone completed) its own investigation.” 296 Given this context,
SB’s disclosure (far from being “innovative’) could be viewed as premature,
careless, and indeed reckless. But then again, counsel to SB (like counsel in FCPA
or other related internal investigations) no doubt secured substantially more in legal
fees by making the disclosure compared to the other reasonable alternative of not
disclosing and remedying any internal control deficiencies.297 In addition, the SB
DPA imposes upon SB various post-enforcement action compliance obligations that
will further increase the company’s professional fees and expenses. 298
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Notwithstanding the important issues raised by the SB action (and perhaps not
too much should be read into the action as it was, after all, only one action), it was
nevertheless incredibly refreshing to read resolution documents in connection with
an alleged corporate bribery offense drafted by someone other than the prosecuting
authority as frequently happens in the U.S. given the prominence of NPAs, DPAs,
and SEC administrative orders to resolve corporate FCPA enforcement actions.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the FCPA nears its 40th anniversary, 2015 was a commemorative year that
witnessed several notable developments. The goal of this article was to paint a
picture for anyone seeking an informed base of knowledge regarding the FCPA and
related legal and policy issues in the FCPA’s modern era; dissecting FCPA
enforcement in a number of ways and highlighting statistics from 2015 as well as
historical comparisons and discussing a range of noteworthy issues from 2015 such
as expansive and evolving FCPA enforcement theories,299 judicial scrutiny of FCPA
and related enforcement theories,300 policy pronouncements and developments
relevant to FCPA issues,301 and developments beyond the FCPA that nevertheless
touch upon FCPA issues or are otherwise relevant to a similar space.302
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